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Équilibre de Stackelberg Stationnaire Fort dans les jeux
stochastiques actualisés
Résumé : Dans cet article, nous nous focalisons sur les équilibres de Stackelberg
pour pour les jeux stochastiques actualisés. Nous commençons par formaliser le concept
d’équilibre fort de Stackelberg en politiques stationnaires (Strong Stationary Stackelberg
Equilibria, SSSE) pour ces jeux. Nous exhibons des classes de jeux pour lesquels le SSSE
existe et nous montrons par des contre-exemples que les SSSE n’existent pas dans le cas
général. Nous définissons des opérateurs de programmation dynamique appropriés pour ce
concept dont les points fixes sont nommés FPE (Fixed Point Equilibria). Nous montrons
que le FPE et le SSSE coïncident pour la classe de jeux stochastiques avec stratégie
du “follower” myope (Myopic Follower Strategy, MFS). Nous montrons des exemples
numériques qui éclairent la relation entre SSSE et FPE ainsi que le comportement des
algorithmes Value Iteration, Policy Iteration, et la formulation par Programmation
Mathématique de ce problème. Finalement, nous décrivons une application dans le
domaine de la sécurité pour illustrer les concepts de solution et l’efficacité des algorithmes
introduits dans ce rapport.
Mots-clés : Jeux stochastiques, Équilibre de Stackelberg, Contrôle optimal
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1 Introduction
Stackelberg games model interactions between strategic agents, where one agent, the
leader, can enforce a commitment to a strategy and the remaining agents, referred to
as followers, take that decision into account when selecting their own strategies. This
Stackelberg game interaction can be extended to a multistage setting where leader and
followers repeatedly make strategic decisions. Such dynamic Stackelberg models have
been considered in applications in economics [1], marketing and supply chain management
[12], dynamic congestion pricing [19], and security [5]. For example, in a dynamic security
application, a defender could decide on a strategy to patrol a number of targets over
multiple periods and the attackers would take this defender patrol into consideration
when deciding whether to attack and where in each period.
The sequential interaction between leader and follower in Stackelberg games and
Stackelberg stochastic games, characterizes its equilibrium solutions with a system of
optimality conditions that are in general non-linear and non convex. Previous work has
developed specialized methods to find such equilibrium solutions for different problem
types. In the specific case of Stackelberg security games, bi-level mathematical opti-
mization formulations have been used to compute the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium
solution [9] and, in the case of stochastic games, the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in
stationary strategies (SSSE) [5]. An alternative method determines the SSSE by solving
a non-linear potential game formulation [3]. These solution methods are either tailored
for specific problems or only capable of solving small instances. It is therefore important
to study alternative solution methods for Stackelberg stochastic games that are general
and could solve large instances.
In this paper, we propose to use iterative algorithms, based on the operator formalism,
to compute the SSSE solution of stochastic games. Our proposal is to use the well-known
algorithms for solving Markov Decision Processes, Value Iteration and Policy Iteration,
based on a suitably defined dynamic programming operator. Such algorithms are both
conceptually simple and have a small computational burden per iteration. However, their
use raises the question of convergence: do they converge, and if so, do they converge
to some SSSE? Answering these questions led us to: a) conclude that SSSE do not
necessarily exist, something not obvious from the current literature; b) identify classes of
games where iterative algorithms converge to an SSSE. We then exploited this property
in the analysis of a model of dynamic planning of police patrols on a transportation
graph.
In the remainder of this introduction we clarify the problem under consideration,
present related literature, describe the contributions of our work and introduce the
notation that is used in this paper.
1.1 Problem Statement
We present now the notion of Strong Stackelberg Equilibria in Stationary policies (SSSE)
for Stochastic Games.
Consider a dynamic system evolving in discrete time on a finite set of states, where
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two players control the evolution. Players have a perfect information on the state of
the system. One of them, called Leader or Player A, observes the current state s and
commits to a, possibly mixed, strategy f depending solely on the state s. Then the
other player, called Follower or Player B, observes the state and strategy of Player A and
plays his best response denoted by g. Given the selected strategies there is a one-step
reward for each player (rfgA (s) and r
fg
B (s) for player A and B, respectively) and a random

























 · · ·
Aggregated payoffs for both players are evaluated with the expected total discounted
revenue over the infinite horizon, each player having their own discount factor. The aim
for the leader is to find a policy that, in each state, maximizes her revenue taking into
account that the follower will observe this policy and will respond by optimizing his own
payoff. This general “Stackelberg” approach to the solution of the game is complemented
with the rule that if the follower is indifferent between strategies, he chooses the one that
benefits the leader: this refinement is the strong Stackelberg solution.
1.2 Related bibliography
The study of Strong Stackelberg Equilibria (SSE) has received much attention in the
recent literature due to its relevance in security applications [9]. In static games, the need
to generalize the standard Stackelberg equilibrium has been pointed out by Leitman [10]
who introduced a conservative version of it. This generalization is formalized in Breton
et al [2] as a Weak Stackelberg Equilibrium, together with the definition of the optimistic
generalization, the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium. The relationship between SSE and
bi-level optimization appears in [2], solution methods for static Stackelberg Games are
discussed in [6].
Stackelberg equilibria in multi-stage and dynamic games have been studied in [14,
15]. In particular, authors propose in [14] to focus on feedback strategies that can be
obtained via dynamic programming. The idea is reused in [2] which introduces Strong
Sequential Stackelberg Equilibria, in a setting very similar to ours. The notable difference
is that, in the problem they consider, the follower gets to observe the action of the leader,
not just its strategy. In their analysis, the formalism of operators linked to dynamic
programming, introduced by Denardo [7] and developed in [18], is essential. Our analysis
uses this formalism as well.
The stochastic game model we study in this paper is also the topic of Vorobeychik
and Singh in [16]. Although they do not provide any formal definition of SSSE, authors
show that SSSE always exist in stochastic games for team games where both players
have the same rewards by reducing the game to a MDP. They also propose mathematical
Inria
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programming formulations to find the SSSE, extending the analysis for MDPs (see
[13, ch. 6.]) and Nash equilibrium in stochastic games [8], for this case. Similar
mathematical programming formulations are established in [5] and [17] for problems in
security applications. However, no prior work has provided a proof of the relationship
between the solutions of these mathematical programming formulations and the SSSE of
the stochastic game being considered. In this paper we present conditions that guarantee
the existence of SSSE for stochastic games in diverse classes of problems, including team
games. Furthermore we present numerical examples that suggest that the mathematical
programming formulation computes the SSSE solution when it exists.
The complexity of computing a SSE is studied in [11]. That work shows, by reduction
to 3SAT, that it is NP-hard to determine a SSE for a Stackelberg Stochastic Game with
any discount factor β > 0 common for both players. The possibility that a Stackelberg
Stochastic Game does not have a SSE is not mentioned.
As mentioned above, security applications are an important motivation for research
on dynamic games. An attacker-defender Stackelberg security game is also considered
in [3] for a repeated stochastic Markov chain game. This problem is represented as
a potential game in terms of a suitable Lyapunov function, which is used to prove
convergence results to compute the strong Stackelberg equilibrium [4]. While this method
is a general approach for Ergodic Markov chains, the results presented show solutions
only for instances with few states. It is interesting to single out the stochastic game
model described in [8, Chapter 6.3]. The authors are interested in the average reward and
the solution concept used is the Nash Equilibrium, a choice different from ours. However,
the model has the feature that only one player, the defender, controls the transitions
between states. This feature is one of the properties that guarantees the existence of
SSSE, as we will show later.
1.3 Contribution
While previous work has formulated Stackelberg equilibrium for stochastic games and
considered different solution methods to compute the SSSE, to the best of our knowledge
the general question of the existence of SSSE is still largely open, in the sense that, so
far: a) no case of non-existence is reported, b) few sufficient conditions for existence have
been established. Furthermore, no work to date has advocated the use of the operator
method, neither for the mathematical analysis of the problem, nor for its algorithmic
solution.
We contribute to the issue in the following ways: First, we give a formal definition of
the Strong Stationary Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSSE) in stochastic games (Section 1.4).
We develop the operator-based analysis of such games by introducing an operator acting
on the space of value functions. The operator introduced is related to the one-step
evaluation of each player’s payoff. We then define Fixed Point Equilibria (FPE) as the
fixed points of this operator. Next, we introduce the class of games with Myopic Follower
Strategy (MFS), for which specific operators are relevant. We prove that these operators
are contractive. Finally, we introduce the algorithms for computing FPE, for general
games and for games with MFS. We prove the convergence of both Value Iteration
RR n° 9271
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and Policy Iteration to the FPE of games with MFS. We also recall the Mathematical
Programming formulation for SSSE. This is the topic of Section 2.
Next, we focus on the general question of existence of SSSE and FPE, and how they
are related. We show that games with MFS and Team Games have both SSSE and FPE
and that they coincide. The operator formalism is instrumental in this proof. We also
address the classes of Zero-Sum Games and Acyclic Games. This analysis is developed in
Section 3.
We then illustrate different situations with specific examples. In a first case, an FPE
and an SSSE exist and coincide, although the game does not have MFS (the assumption
of our main existence result). In a second case, depending on the parameters: either no
SSSE exist, or no FPE exist, or both an SSSE and an FPE exist but they do not coincide.
In a third case, an FPE exists but Value Iteration does not necessarily converge to it.
These examples are summarized in Section 4 and described in more detail in Appendix C.
Finally, we take advantage of the convergence properties we have shown, to propose
a solution methodology in a dynamic security game, representing the problem of security
patrols in a network. This is reported in Section 5.
1.4 Notation and definitions
We introduce now formally the elements of the model and the notation. A synthesis of
this notation is presented in Appendix A.
Let S represent the finite set of states of the game. Let A,B denote the finite set of
actions available to players A and B respectively, and we denote by As ⊂ A and Bs ⊂ B
the actions available in state s ∈ S. For a given state s ∈ S and actions a ∈ As and
b ∈ Bs, Qab(s′|s) represents the transition probabilities of reaching the state s′ ∈ S. We
denote with Q the family of these probability distributions. The reward received by
each player in state s when selecting actions a ∈ As and b ∈ Bs is referred to as the
one-step reward functions and are given by rA = rabA (s) and rB = rabB (s). The constants
βA, βB ∈ [0, 1) are discount factors for Player A and B respectively. In our setting time
increases discretely and the time horizon is infinite. Therefore we represent a two-person
stochastic discrete game G by
G = (S,A,B, Q, rA, rB, βA, βB) .
Strategies. We denote by P(As) and P(Bs) the sets of distribution functions over As
and Bs, respectively. The sets of stationary strategies are defined by:
WA = {f : S → P(A)| f(s) ∈ P(As)}
WB = {g : S → P(B)| g(s) ∈ P(Bs)} .
For f ∈WA, f(s) is a probability measure on As. In order to simplify the notation, we
represent with f(s, a) = (f(s))({a}) = f(a|s) the probability that Player A chooses action
a when in state s. Likewise, for g ∈WB, we denote with g(s, b) = g(b|s) the probability
that Player B chooses b when in state s. In the case that g ∈WB is a deterministic policy,
Inria
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we will denote directly with g(s) the element of Bs that has probability one. The notation
will be clear from context. The set WB is assumed to be equipped with a total order
≺B, which will be used for determining a unique element in case Player B is indifferent
between several policies.
In order to simplify notation, given stationary strategies f and g, we define the reward






f(s, a)g(s, b)rabi (s). (1.1)
Values. Given a pair (f, g) ∈WA×WB, the evolution of the states is that of a Markov




b∈Bs f(s, a)g(s, b)Q
ab(s′|s).
Denote with {Sn}n the (random) sequence of states of this Markov chain and Efgs the
expectation corresponding to the distribution of this sequence, conditioned on the initial
state being S0 = s. Then the value of this pair of strategies for Player i, from state s, is:


















f(Sk, a)g(Sk, b)rabi (Sk)
 .
Reaction sets. We proceed with the definition of the player’s reaction sets. These
definitions rely heavily on the fact that when the leader selects a stationary strategy, the
follower faces a finite-state, finite-action, discounted MDP. It is then well-known that
there exists optimal stationary and deterministic policies which maximize simultaneously
the follower’s values starting from any state. Moreover, the set of optimal policies is the
cartesian product of the set of optimal decisions in each state. This fact results from e.g.
Corollary 6.2.8, p. 153 in [13].
Accordingly, let:
RB(f) := {g ∈WB | V fgB (s) ≥ V
fh




SRB(f) := {g ∈ RB(f) | V fgA (s) ≥ V
fh
A (s),∀s ∈ S, h ∈ RB(f)} (1.4)
γB(f) := max≺B SRB(f)
RA(s) := {f ∈WA | V fγB(f)A (s) ≥ V
hγB(h)
A (s),∀h ∈WA} . (1.5)
Given that Player A selects strategy f , RB(f) represents the set of deterministic best-
response strategies of Player B. As argued above, this set is nonempty. The set SRB(f) is
that of strong best-responses, which break ties in favor of Player A. It is possible to break
ties simultaneously in all states s, because optimal policies of the MDP form a cartesian
product. We denote by γB(f) the deterministic policy that is the actual best response of
Player B to Player A’s f . Finally, RA(s) is the set of Player A’s best strategies when
starting from state s.
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Equilibria. With these notations, we can now define Strong Stackelberg Equilibria of
the dynamic game, called here Stationary SSE, as the SSE for the static game where
players use stationary strategies in WA ×WB. It corresponds to the definitions in [11,
16].
Definition 1 (SSSE). A strategy pair (f, g) ∈WA ×WB is a Stationary Strong Stackel-
berg Equilibrium if
i/ g = γB(f);
ii/ f ∈ RA(s) for all s ∈ S.
In an SSSE, the strategy f maximizes simultaneously the leader’s reward in every
state. In contrast with MDP where this is always possible, there is no guarantee that
this will happen in a Stackelberg stochastic game. Indeed, in Section 4.3 we provide an
example where ∩sRA(s) is empty, and consequently there is no SSSE.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature does not provide general statements
about the existence of an SSSE. We address in Section 3 this issue in special cases.
2 Operators, Fixed Points and Algorithms
In this section, we develop the formalism of operators, as commonly found in texts on
MDPs [13], and also for games in [2, 7, 18]. We focus on fixed points of these operators,
as a means to discuss existence of equilibria, and also as a computational procedure.
Accordingly, we study the monotonicity and contractivity of these operators. This
allows us to prove the convergence of Value Iteration, Policy Iteration and Mathematical
Programming-based algorithms, in certain situations.
2.1 Definition of operators
We start with the definition of one-step (or “return function” [7]) operators. The set
of value functions, i.e. mappings from S to R, will be denoted with F(S). Given

















It is important to note that the value (T fgi v)(s) depends only on f(s) and g(s), and not
on the rest of the strategies f and g. In the following, with a slight abuse of notation, we
will use this quantity for values of f and g specified only at state s.
The set of pairs of value functions is F(S)× F(S). A typical element of it will be
denoted as v = (vA, vB). Using T fgA and T
fg
B we define the operator T fg on F(S)×F(S)
as:
(T fgv)i = T fgi vi
Inria
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for i = A,B.
It will be recalled in Lemma 1 that T fgi is a contraction for i = A,B. It follows that
T fg is contractive as well. As a consequence of Banach’s theorem, it admits a unique
fixed point on the complete space F(S)×F(S) with the supremum norm, that turns out
to be V fg = (V fgA , V
fg
B ), these functions being defined in (1.2).
Extended reaction sets. We now extend the definitions of reaction sets to involve
value functions. They correspond to a dynamic game with only one step and a “scrap
value” v = (vA, vB). In contrast to the sets introduced in Section 2.1 for SSSE, the sets
we discuss here are relative to local strategies depending on each state, rather than global
strategies in WA and WB.
For s ∈ S, f ∈ P(As), v ∈ F(S)×F(S), and vB ∈ F(S), let:
RB(s, f, vB) := {g ∈ Bs | (T fgB vB)(s) ≥ (T
fh
B vB)(s), ∀h ∈ Bs} (2.1)
SRB(s, f, v) := {g ∈ RB(s, f, vB) | (T fgA vA)(s) ≥ (T
fh
A vA)(s),∀h ∈ RB(s, f, vB)} (2.2)
γB(s, f, v) := max≺B SRB(s, f, v) (2.3)
RA(s, v) := {f(s) ∈ P(As) | (T fγB(s,f,v)A vA)(s) ≥ (T
hγB(s,h,v)
A vA)(s),∀h ∈ P(As)} .
(2.4)
The definition of Player B’s response in (2.3) is such that one unique, non-ambiguous
policy is defined as a solution. Any f(s) ∈ RA(s, v) is considered as a solution of the
problem.
The dynamic programming operator. The one-step Strong Stackelberg problem
naturally leads to a mapping in the space of value functions, which is formalized as
follows.









for i = A,B.
Observe that the definition depends on the ordering ≺B. By changing the ordering,
many operators can be defined for the same problem.
Fixed points. We are now in position to define the fixed-point equilibria.
Definition 3 (Fixed Point Equilibrium, FPE). A strategy pair (f, g) ∈ WA ×WB is
an FPE if the function v∗ = V fg, the unique fixed point of T fg, is such that Tv∗ = v∗.
Equivalently, if
i/ g(s) = γB(s, f, v∗) for all s ∈ S;
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ii/ f(s) ∈ RA(s, v∗) for all s ∈ S.
One of the purposes of this paper is to propose results concerning FPEs and SSSE:
discuss whether they respectively exist, and when they do, whether they coincide or not.
2.2 Properties of operators
The following property is well-known (e.g. [13]) for finite-state, finite-action discounted
Markov Reward Processes:
Lemma 1. For i = A,B, the operator T fgi is linear, monotone, contractive and V
fg
i
defined in (1.2) is its unique fixed point. This fixed point has the expression
V fgi = (I − βiQ
fg)−1rfgi , (2.6)
where rfgi is defined in (1.1), where the probability transition matrix Qfg is defined
similarly in Section 1.4, and I is the identity matrix of appropriate dimension.
We now introduce a particular class of games, and the particular properties of
operators for these games.
Definition 4 (Myopic Follower Strategy, MFS). A stochastic game G is said to be
with Myopic Follower Strategy if RB(s, f, vB) = RB(s, f), for all s ∈ S, f ∈ WA and
vB ∈ F(S).
Games with Myopic Follower Strategy are games where the response of the follower is
independent of the expected future values: for her, only immediate rewards are relevant.
As it is stated in Lemma 5, this setting happens whenever βB = 0 (as it is used in [5]) or
the leader controls the transitions of the games, see for e.g. single-controller games in [8].
When a game is with MFS, the reaction of the follower depends only on the leader’s
value vA:
∀f ∈WA, ∀v ∈ F(S)×F(S), ∀s ∈ S, γB(s, f, v) = γB(s, f, vA). (2.7)
Then the following Lemma is relevant.
Lemma 2. Assume (2.7) holds. Then there exists an operator TA from F(S) to F(S)
such that for all v ∈ F(S)×F(S),
(Tv)A = TAvA. (2.8)
Proof. According to Definition (2.4) and due to (2.7), we have RA(s, v) = RA(s, vA) for
all v ∈ F(S) and s ∈ S. Then, from (2.5),
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An alternate construction of operator TA is as follows. It is possible to define, for
each f ∈WA, the operator T
f
A from F(S) to F(S) as:
(T fAvA)(s) = (T
f,γB(s,f,vA)
A vA)(s) . (2.9)
Another consequence of MFS is this property which follows from the definition of γB(·)
in (2.3) and SRB(·) in (2.2):
(T fAvA)(s) = max
g∈RB(s,f)
(T fgA vA)(s) . (2.10)
In this equation, the maximization set on the right-hand side does not depend on v at
all. Finally, define the operator TA from F(S) to F(S) as, for all s ∈ S:
(TAvA)(s) = max
f∈WA
(T fAvA)(s) . (2.11)
Observe that the maximum is indeed attained, because the right-hand side is a linear
combination of the finite set of values f(s, a), a ∈ As.
We can now state the principal tool of this paper for ascertaining the existence of
FPE.
Theorem 1. Let G be a stochastic game with MFS, then it is true that:
a) For any stationary strategy f ∈WA, the operator T
f
A : F(S)→ F(S), defined in
(2.9) is a contraction on (F(S), || · ||∞) of modulus βA.
b) The operator TA defined in (2.11) is a contraction on (F(S), || · ||∞), of modulus
βA.
c) For any stationary strategy f ∈ WA, operator T
f
A is monotone. Operator TA is
monotone as well.
Proof. The central argument of the proof is the following fact. Let h1 and h2 be two
real functions defined on some set B, where they attain their maximum. Then for all
b1 ∈ arg maxB{h1(b)} and all b2 ∈ arg maxB{h2(b)},




{h2(b)} ≤ h1(b1)− h2(b1) . (2.12)
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≤ βA||vA − uA||∞ .
By reversing the roles of vA and uA, then taking the maximum over s ∈ S we have that:






AuA)(s)| ≤ βA||vA − uA||∞ ,
concluding that T fA is a contracting map of modulus βA.



















≤ βA||vA − uA||∞.
Then, by reversing the roles of vA, uA and taking the maximum the result follows.
Consider now statement c). If vA ≥ uA, then from (2.13) with (2.12) and (2.14),











Then c) also holds. The extension to TA is classical.
2.3 Value Iteration Algorithms
Value Iteration generally consists in applying a dynamic programming operator to some
initial value function, until a convergence criterion is met. Specifically, given some ε > 0,
Value Iteration applies some operator repeatedly until the distance between two functions
vnA and v
n+1
A is less than ε.
In view of the preceding discussion, two variants of the algorithm will be used: one for
the general situation (Algorithm 1) and one for the specific situation of MFS, i.e. when
(2.7) holds (Algorithm 2).
Inria
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Algorithm 1 Value function iteration for infinite horizon; general case
Require: ε > 0
1: Initialize with n = 0, v0A(s) = v0B(s) = 0 for every s ∈ S
2: repeat
3: n := n+ 1
4: Compute vn as vn(s) := (Tvn−1)(s), ∀s ∈ S
with T according to Definition (2.5)
5: until ||vn − vn−1||∞ ≤ ε
6: Pick (f∗, g∗) such that vn(s) = (T f∗g∗vn−1)(s) for all s ∈ S
7: return Approximate Stationary Strong Stackelberg policies (f∗, g∗)
Algorithm 2 Value function iteration for infinite horizon; simplified case
Require: ε > 0
1: Initialize with n = 0, v0A(s) = 0 for every s ∈ S
2: repeat
3: n := n+ 1
4: Compute vnA as vnA(s) := (TAv
n−1
A )(s), ∀s ∈ S
with T as in (2.11)
5: until ||vnA − v
n−1
A ||∞ ≤ ε




A )(s) and g∗ such that g∗(s) = γB(s, f∗, v
n−1
A ), for
all s ∈ S
7: return Approximate Stationary Strong Stackelberg policies (f∗, g∗)
There is no guarantee in general that Algorithm 1 will converge, and we present in
Section 4.4 an example where it does not. However, thanks to Theorem 2, we can state
that Algorithm 2 does converge.
Theorem 2. Let G be a stochastic game with MFS. Then the sequence of value functions
vnA in Algorithm 2 converges to v∗A, which is the fixed point of TA. Moreover the following
bounds hold:
||v∗A − vnA||∞ ≤
2βnA||rA||∞
1− βA







Proof. Let the pair of policies (f∗, g∗) be the ones returned by Algorithm 2 and V f
∗g∗
A
be the fixed point of T f
∗
A . By Theorem 1 b) and Banach’s Theorem, we know that TA









A||∞ + ||vnA − v∗A||∞ . (2.15)
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A||∞ + βA||vnA − vn−1A ||∞,
where the first equality is by definition, the inequality right after is the triangular
inequality. The third line is because of the definition of T f
∗
A and the inequality is because
T
f∗








||vnA − vn−1A ||∞.
For the second term on the right-hand side of (2.15), we have:






































A||∞ ≤ βn−1A ||v
0
A − v1A||∞ = βn−1||v1A||∞ ≤ βn−1A ||rA||∞
the result follows.
2.4 Policy Iteration
The Policy Iteration (PI) algorithm directly iterates in the policy space. This algorithm
starts with an arbitrary policy f and then finds the optimal infinite discounted horizon
values, taking into account the optimal response g(f). These values are then used to
compute new policies. These two steps of the algorithm can be defined as the Evaluation
Phase and the Improvement Phase.
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As in the previous section, two variants of the algorithm will be used: one for the
general situation (Algorithm 3) and one for the specific situation of a MFS, i.e. when
(2.7) holds (Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 3 Policy Iteration (PI); general case
1: Require ε > 0
2: Initialize with n = 0
3: Choose an arbitrary pair of strategies (f0, g0) ∈WA ×WB with g0(s) = γB(s, f0,0)
for all s ∈ S
4: Compute u0 = (u0A, u0B) fixed point of T f0g0
5: repeat
6: n := n+ 1
7: Improvement Phase: Find a pair of strategies (fn, gn) such that T fngnun−1 =
Tun−1 with gn(s) = γB(s, fn, un−1) for all s ∈ S
8: Evaluation Phase: Find un = (unA, unB), fixed point of the operator T fngn
9: until ||un − un−1||∞ ≤ ε
10: f∗ := fn; g∗(s) := γB(s, fn, un) for all s ∈ S
11: return Approximate Stationary Strong Stackelberg policies (f∗, g∗)
Algorithm 4 Policy Iteration (PI); simplified case
1: Require ε > 0
2: Initialize with n = 0
3: Choose an arbitrary pair of strategies (f0, g0) ∈WA ×WB with g0(s) = γB(s, f0,0)
for all s ∈ S




6: n := n+ 1







8: Evaluation Phase: Find unA fixed point of the operator T
fn
A
9: until ||unA − u
n−1
A ||∞ ≤ ε
10: f∗ := fn; g∗(s) := γB(s, fn, unA) for all s ∈ S
11: return Approximate Stationary Strong Stackelberg policies (f∗, g∗)
The Evaluation Phase in Algorithm 3 (respectively Algorithm 4) requires to solve
two (resp. one) linear systems of size |S| × |S|. On the other hand, the Improvement
Phase can be implemented by solving a static Strong Stackelberg equilibrium for each
state s ∈ S. Now we prove that Algorithm 4 converges to the SSSE. In other words, the
PI algorithm converges to the SSSE for stochastic games with MFS.
Lemma 3. If a function vA ∈ F(S) satisfies vA ≤ T
f
AvA, for some f ∈ P(A) then
vA ≤ vfA, where v
f
A is the unique fixed point of T
f
A in F(S). The same holds for TA.
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and by Theorem 1 a), when n→∞,
(T fA)nvA −→ v
f
A .
The result follows for T fA. The proof for TA is similar.
Theorem 3. Suppose that Condition (2.7) holds. The sequence of functions unA in
Algorithm 3 verifies unA ↑ v∗A . Further, if for any n ∈ N, unA = u
n+1
A , then it is true that
unA = v∗A .
Proof. For each s ∈ S, we have that
u0A(s) = T
f0
A (u0A)(s) ≤ TA(u0A)(s) = T
f1
A (u0A)(s) .












Iterating over n, we have that
unA ≤ TA(unA) ≤ un+1A . (2.16)
Now the sequence {unA}n∈N being non-decreasing and bounded by ||rA||∞/(1− βA),
there exists a value function uA such that for any s ∈ S
uA(s) = limn→∞unA(s) .
Taking n → ∞ in (2.16), uA ≤ TA(uA) ≤ uA and therefore uA = TA(uA), and by
uniqueness of the fixed point
uA = v∗A ,
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and we have the first claim of the theorem: unA ↑ v∗A. Also, if it is verified for some n
that unA = u
n+1
A , then, using (2.16),
un+1A = u
n
A ≤ TAunA ≤ un+1A ,
which implies
unA = TAunA = v∗A ,
where the second equality is again given by the uniqueness of the fixed point. The second
claim follows.
The results exposed in this section strongly rely on the fact that γB(s, f, v) is
independent on vB. In Section 3 we show that MFS is a sufficient condition for the
existence of an FPE but all the results here may fail in the general case.
2.5 Mathematical Programming Formulations
In this section we develop the discussion of Mathematical Programming (MP) formulations,
as the one proposed in [16]. To start the discussion we notice that for each f ∈WA the
follower solves an MDP with transition and rewards given by the expectation induced by
f . Then, as argued in Section 1.4, there exists (at least) one optimal policy in the set of
deterministic stationary policies. This policy g can be retrieved by finding deterministic
policies that induce a fixed point of the operator T fγ(s,f,v)B . This condition is modeled as
the following set of non-linear constraints:
0 ≤ vB(s)− (T fgB vB)(s) ≤MB(1− gsb) s ∈ S, b ∈ Bs (2.17)∑
b∈Bs
gsb = 1 s ∈ S (2.18)
gsb ∈ {0, 1} s ∈ S, b ∈ Bs. (2.19)
The variable of the program gsb is meant to represent the probability g(s, b).
For each f ∈ WA, the deterministic best response set of the follower is determined
by constraints (2.17)–(2.19). In (2.17) the constant MB is chosen so that when gsb = 0,
the upper bound is not constraining. Since ||vB||∞ ≤ ||rB||∞/(1 − βB), the value
MB = 2||rB||∞/(1 − βB) is adequate. Now the leader’s problem can be reduced to
determine which f maximizes in each state its total expected reward. Vorobeychik and





s.t. Constraints (2.17), (2.18), (2.19)∑
a∈As
fsa = 1 s ∈ S
vA(s)− (T fgA vA)(s) ≤MA(1− gsb) s ∈ S, b ∈ Bs (2.21)
fsa ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ As.
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where α ∈ R|S|+ is a non-negative vector of coefficients. Problem (MP) above is a non-
linear optimization problem with integer variables. Such problems are challenging to
solve in general. In particular, constraints (2.17) and (2.21) are non-convex quadratic
constraints that involve integer variables.
This optimization problem is built based on an analogy to MDPs. In particular, it
uses the reduction to a single objective using a vector of weights in (2.20). For MDPs,
this choice is arbitrary. As it turns out in the experiments presented in Section 4, the
result of (MP) sometimes depends on the vector αs, and sometimes it is not an SSSE. We
observe that when such anomalies occur, the operator TA is not monotone. On the other
hand, in cases where TA is known to be monotone, no such problems seem to occur. We
therefore conjecture that for the correctness of (MP), it is necessary to have monotonicity
of the operator.
3 Existence Results for SSSE and FPE.
In this section we present existence results for Stationary Strong Stackelberg Equilibria
and Fixed-Points Equilibria of the dynamic programming operator. The general idea
underlying these results is that, under certain assumptions, it can be proved that some
operator, typically T or TA defined in Section 2, is contractive. Using Banach’s theorem,
it then has a fixed point with which the solution is constructed. Then, still under some
assumptions, this FPE solution is shown to be an SSSE.
3.1 Single-state results
In the case where there is only one state, the game is equivalent to a static game, so that
SSE and SSSE coincide. Indeed, if S = {s0}, it is clear that




for all (f, g) ∈WA ×WB, so that optimization of V fgi and of r
fg
i are equivalent.
The existence of an SSSE for single-state games is well accepted in the literature with
however no clear reference. In this section, we state and prove this result and connect it
to the FPE.
We start with a general and useful result that applies to any game.
Lemma 4. Let G be a stochastic game. For all s ∈ S, the set RA(s) is nonempty.
Proof. We use the scheme of proof of Proposition 3.1 in [15]. Fix a state s ∈ S. Define
D = {(f, g) ∈ WA ×WB|g ∈ RB(f)}. The value functions V fgi can be expressed as
V fgi = (I − βiQfg)−1r
fg
i . Due to the finiteness of S, this is a rational function of f
and g. It does not have singularities inside WA ×WB and is therefore continuous. In
particular, the mappings (f, g) 7→ V fgi (s) are continuous. Since WA and WB are compact,
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the maximum theorem applies: the maximum of this function over D exists. Therefore
the set RA(s) is nonempty.
Theorem 4. If the game G has only one state, then it has an SSSE which is also an
FPE.
Proof. Let S have a single state: S = {s0}. The existence of SSSE is a particular case of
Lemma 4. The existence of an FPE follows from the observation that the game is MFS:
Theorem 1 applies to it. Being a contraction, the operator TA has a unique fixed point
from which an FPE is constructed. There remains to show that this FPE coincides with
the SSSE.
To that end, we first show that RB(f) = RB(s0, f) for all f ∈WA (since the game is
with MFS, this latter set does not depend on vB ∈ F(S)). If g ∈ RB(s0, f), then for all
h ∈WB,







= V fhB (s0)
which means that g ∈ RB(f). By the same token, if g ∈ RB(f) then g ∈ RB(s0, f).
So both reaction sets coincide. Since V fgA and r
fg
A are also proportional, breaking ties
in favor of the leader is the same problem for SSSE and FPE: the sets SRB(f) and
SRB(s0, f, vB) also coincide, and γB(f) = γB(s0, f, v) for all f ∈WA and v ∈ F(S). It
follows from (1.5) and (2.4) that RA(s0) = RA(s0, v) for all v, which means that SSSE
and FPE coincide.
An alternative algorithmic proof of the existence of the SSSE in Theorem 4 is provided
in Appendix B. This is based in the Multiple LPs algorithm which also give as a polynomial
algorithm to solve an SSSE in the static case.
3.2 Myopic Follower Strategies
Theorem 5 (FPE for MFS). If the game G is with MFS then it admits an FPE.
Proof. According to Theorem 1 b), the operator TA is contractive. It therefore admits
a fixed point v∗A. Let f∗ ∈ WA be defined by, for each s ∈ S, f∗(s) = RA(s, v∗A). Let
g∗ ∈ WB be defined for each s ∈ S, by g∗(s) = γB(s, f∗, v∗A) = γB(s, f∗, v∗). We show
that (f∗, g∗) is an FPE.
To avoid confusion in the notation, denote with U = V f∗g∗ , the unique fixed point of
T f
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The first line is the definition of v∗A as a fixed point. The second one is the definition of
operator TA in (2.8) and that of T in (2.5), combined with the MFS property, see the
proof of Lemma 2. The third one is by definition of f∗ and g∗. This last line is equivalent
to saying that v∗A is the fixed-point of operator T
f∗g∗
A , hence v∗A = UA. As a consequence,
(TU)A = UA.
There remains to be seen that (TU)B = UB. We have: (TU)B = T f
∗g∗
B UB = UB
since by definition of U , UB is the fixed point of T f
∗g∗ . This completes the proof.
In the following Lemma 5, we show that there are actually two main classes games
which have MFS. We introduce now these classes of games with one important subclass.
Myopic follower: We define a game as a myopic follower game if βB = 0. Note that in
this case the follower at any step of the game does not take into account the future
rewards, but only the instantaneous rewards.
In this case, the one-step operator of the follower is: (T fgB vB)(s) = r
fg
B (s) (see
(1.1)) and it clearly does not depend on vB. Therefore, the reaction set RB(s, f, vB)
defined in (1.3) does not depend either on vB: RB(s, f, vB) = RB(s, f). It follows
that the follower’s best response has the form (2.7).
Leader-Controller Discounted Games: This case is a particular case of the Single-
controller discounted game described in Filar and Vrieze [8], where the controller is
the leader. In other words, the transition law has the form Qab(z|s) = Qa(z|s).
In that case, the one-step operator of the follower is:




















Then, for g, h ∈WB, we have: (T fgB vB)(s)− (T
fh




B (s) and the
difference does not depend on vB. The reaction set RB(s, f, vB) is defined as those
g such that: ∀h ∈ Bs, (T fgB vB)(s) − (T
fh
B vB)(s) ≥ 0. It is therefore independent
from vB for any s ∈ S, and as before, (2.7) holds.
Multi-stage games: in such games, the state evolves sequentially and deterministically
through s1, s2, . . . , sK and stops. This can be seen a particular case of Leader-
Controlled Discounted Game, where the evolution is actually not controlled at all.
An additional terminal state with trivial reward functions may be needed to model
the end of a game with finitely many stages.
The reduction of MFS to these classes is the topic of the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let G be a game with MFS. Then one the following statements is true:
i/ βB = 0;
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ii/ Qab(z|s) = Qa(z|s) for all s, z ∈ S and all a ∈ As, b ∈ Bs.
Proof. We prove by contradiction the following statement:
∀s ∈ S,∀a ∈ As, ∀b ∈ Bs,∀z ∈ S, βB (Qab(z|s)−Qab
′(z|s)) = 0 , (3.2)
which itself is equivalent to the statement of the lemma.
For each a ∈ As and s ∈ S, consider the policy where the leader plays the pure strategy
a, denoted by δa. Take b∗ ∈ RB(s, δa, vB) for a given vB (note that RB(s, f, vB) 6= ∅).
Then it is true that for all b ∈ Bs:
rab
∗









Suppose by contradiction that (3.2) does not hold. Then there exists s, a, b and b′ such
that ξ = βB(Qab
∗(z∗|s)−Qab′(z∗|s)) 6= 0 for some z∗. Then by taking v′B(z∗) with the
opposite sign of ξ big enough, and v′B(z) = 0, for z 6= z∗, the inequality will turn negative.
That would mean that b∗ does not belong to RB(s, f, v′B) with v′B and then the game is
not MFS. This is a contradiction, so such elements s, a, b, b′, z do not exist, and (3.2)
holds.
We now state the principal results of this section: the MFS property implies the
existence of both FPE and SSSE, and their coincidence.
Theorem 6. Let G be a stochastic game with MFS. Then G has an SSSE, which
corresponds to its FPE.
Proof. Let (f∗, g∗) be the FPE of game G, and V ∗ = V f∗g∗ . We know that the FPE





We first prove that RB(f∗) =
∏
s∈S RB(s, f∗). According to Lemma 5, since the
game has MFS, then either βB = 0, or the game is Leader-Controlled Discounted. In
both cases, the value of Player B has the form (see (2.6)):
V fgB = (I − βBQ
f )−1rfgB ,
where Qf is the leader-controlled transition matrix, relevant only in case βB 6= 0. We
note that, given that the matrix (I − βiQf )−1 is positive, rfgB ≥ r
fh





Additionally, if for some s, g, h, rfgB (s) > r
fh
B (s), then V
fg
B (s) > V
fh
B (s).
Let f be an arbitrary element of WA. On the one hand,
∏
sRB(s, f) ⊂ RB(f). To
see this, pick g ∈
∏









this means g ∈ RB(f). The set RB(f) is therefore nonempty. On the other hand,
RB(f) ⊂
∏
sRB(s, f). To see this, pick g ∈ RB(f) (the set is not empty). If it is not
in
∏
sRB(s, f), then there is some s and some b ∈ RB(s, f) such that r
fb
B (s) > r
fg
B (s).
Then the policy h ∈WB which coincides with g except at state s where h(s) = b, is such
that V fhB (s) > V
fg
B (s), a contradiction. Therefore,
∏
sRB(s, f) = RB(f), for all f ∈WA.
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At this point, we have shown that Player B reacts the same way to Player A’s
strategy f , in the SSSE problem or in the FPE problem with any scrap value function v.
Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the strong reaction is the same, since that of the
FPE problem does depend on the scrap value v.
However, we know that Player B’s tie-breaking problem in (1.4) is a Markov Decision
Problem. This means that the value of Player A after Player B’s strong reaction, say V fA ,
is given by a Bellman equation, namely:
V fA (s) = max
g∈RB(f)




{rfbA (s) + βA(Q
fbV fA )(s)} (3.3)
for all s ∈ S. Here, we have used the fact that RB(f) is a cartesian product, and that
MDPs can be solved state by state. We recognize in the right-hand side of (3.3) the
operator T fA defined in (2.10). In other words, V
f
A is the fixed point of T
f
A.
Let then define UA ∈ F(S) as:
UA(s) = max
f∈WA
V fA (s) = V
fs
A (s) .
Here, fs ∈ WA realizes the maximum for state s. By construction, UA(s) ≥ V fA (s) for
any particular f ∈WA. We proceed to prove that UA = V ∗A. First, consider the action of
TA on UA: for s ∈ S,
(TAUA)(s) = max
f∈WA






A )(s) = V
fs
A (s) = UA(s) .
The first equality is the definition of TA. The first inequality is clear. The second one
results from the monotonicity of operator T fA. The second equality is because V fs is the
fixed point of T fsA . Then according to Lemma 3, TAUA ≥ UA implies UA ≤ V ∗A since V ∗A
is the fixed point of TA.
Now, since V ∗A = V
f∗
A , the fixed point of operator T
f∗
A , then for all s ∈ S, UA(s) =
maxf V fA (s) ≥ V
f∗
A (s) = V ∗A(s). In other words, UA ≥ V ∗A. We conclude that indeed
UA = V ∗A.
As a consequence, we have shown that f∗ ∈ ∩s∈SRA(s), that is, (f∗, g∗) is an
SSSE.
3.3 Zero-Sum Games
In zero-sum games, βA = βB and rB = −rA.
Theorem 7. If the game G is a Zero-Sum Game, then it admits an FPE.
The existence of an FPE follows from the contractivity of the operator associated, in
a similar way as in [7, Section 8] for Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games. We include
here an argument in the line of the proof of Theorem 1.
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Proof. Consider a function v in the setW = {v ∈ F(S)×F(S)|vB = −vA}. Since vB can
be substituted with −vA, it turns out that SRB(s, f, v) = RB(s, f, vB) = RB(s, f,−vA)
and γB(s, f, v) can be made dependent only on vA; in other words, it satisfies (2.7). It is
then possible to define the operator T fA as in (2.9). This operator maps W to W.
On the other hand, (T fAvA)(s) = (T
f,γ(s,f,vA)
A vA)(s) = (T
f,g
A vA)(s) for all g ∈
RB(s, f, vA). But for every f, g, T fgA vA = −T
fg
B vB. And by definition (2.1), for all
g ∈ RB(s, f, vA), h ∈WB, (T fgB vB)(s) ≥ (T
fh
B vB)(s), which is equivalent to (T
fg
A vA)(s) ≤
(T fhA vA)(s). In other words,




(T fAvA)(s) = min
g∈WB
(T fgA vA)(s) .
As it was the case in (2.10), the minimization set in the right-hand side does not depend
on vA. The proof of Theorem 1 then applies mutatis mutandis, to conclude that operator
TA is contractive on W . It then admits a fixed point v∗A in that set. Then the argument
in the proof of Theorem 5 applies, and the FPE of the game is constructed from this
fixed point.
3.4 Team Games
A result of [16] (Proposition 1) is that Team Games have an SSSE. Team Games (also
known as Identical-Goal Games in [15]) are such that both players seek to maximize
the same metric. This is a property of reward functions only. We slightly generalize the
definition of these games and state a similar result for FPE.
Definition 5 (Team Game). The game is a Team Game if βA = βB and there exists
real constants µ and ν > 0 such that: rabB (s) = µ+ νrabA (s).
Theorem 8. If the game G is a Team Game, then it admits an FPE.
Proof. We adapt the proof of Theorem 7. Consider a function v in the set W = {v ∈
F(S) × F(S)|vB = µ1−β + νvA}. Since vB can be expressed as a function of vA, then
SRB(s, f, v) and γB(s, f, v) can be made dependent only on vA; in other words, it satisfies
(2.7). It is then possible to define the operator T fA as in (2.9), mapping F(S) to F(S).
On the other hand, (T fAvA)(s) = (T
f,γ(s,f,vA)
A vA)(s) = (T
f,g
A vA)(s) for all g ∈




A vA. The operator T fg then maps W to W and so does T
f
A. And by definition
(2.1), for all g ∈ RB(s, f, vA), h ∈WB, (T fgB vB)(s) ≥ (T
fh
B vB)(s), which is equivalent to
(T fgA vA)(s) ≥ (T
fh
A vA)(s) since ν > 0. In other words,
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so that
(T fAvA)(s) = max
g∈WB
(T fgA vA)(s) .
As it was the case in (2.10), the maximization set in the right-hand side does not depend
on vA. The proof concludes as in the proof of Theorem 7.
3.5 Acyclic Games
Acyclic games are such that state-to-state transitions do not lead back to a visited state,
except for absorbing states. Acyclicity is a property of transition operators only.
We say that state s′ is reachable from state s if there exist k ∈ N, a sequence of
states s = s0, s1, . . . , sk = s′ and actions a0, . . . , ak−1, b0, . . . , bk−1 with Qa0b0(s1|s0) ×
Qa1b1(s2|s1)× . . .×Qak−1bk−1(sk|sk−1) > 0.
Definition 6 (Acyclic Games). The game is an Acyclic Game if the state space S admits
the partition S = S⊥ ∪ S1, with:
• for all s ∈ S⊥, a ∈ As, b ∈ Bs, Qab(s|s) = 1;
• for every pair (s, s′) ∈ S1 × S1, if s′ is reachable from s, then s is not reachable
from s′.
The following theorem is based on Theorem 4 and generalizes it for the FPE part.
Theorem 9. If the stochastic game G is an Acyclic Game, then it admits an FPE.
Proof. The proof will proceed by successive reductions to static (or single-state) games.
The game being acyclic, it is possible to perform a topological sort of the state space.
There exists a partition S = ∪Kk=0Sk with S0 = S⊥ and for every s ∈ Sk, k > 0, if s′ is
reachable from s then s′ ∈ Sk′ with k′ < k. In a first step, we construct a candidate
strategy (f∗, g∗). Then we prove that this strategy solves the FPE problem.
For each s0 ∈ S0 = S⊥, consider G0, the single-state game with S = {s0} and same
strategies, rewards and discount factors. Theorem 4 applies to this game. It states that
an FPE exists, resulting in a pair of strategies (f∗s0 , g
∗
s0) ∈ P(As0)× P(Bs0) and a value
V ∗(s0).
We now construct the strategies (f∗sk , g
∗
sk
) for sk ∈ Sk with a recurrence on k. Assume
this has been done up to k − 1. Pick sk ∈ Sk. Because the game is acyclic, we have, for
any (f, g) ∈WA ×WB,
V fgi (sk) = r
fg





Qfg(s′|s)V ∗i (s′) . (3.4)
Consider the static game (i.e. one-state game with null discount factors) with S = {sk}
and rewards defined with this formula. Again, Theorem 4 applies to this game: an FPE
exist, resulting in a pair of strategies (f∗sk , g
∗
sk
) ∈ P(Ask)×P(Bsk). When k = K, we have
defined this way a strategy (f∗s , g∗s) for each s ∈ S.
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We now prove that this strategy is an FPE. We prove this with a recurrence. More
precisely, we prove that for all k, property Pk holds, which says that for and all sk ∈ Sk:
g∗(sk) = γB(sk, f∗, V ∗)
f∗(sk) = RA(sk, V ∗)
where V ∗i = V
f∗g∗
i is the unique fixed point of operator T
f∗g∗
i for i = A,B. With
Definition 3, the result will follow.
When s0 ∈ S0, the local reaction set LRB(s0, f, V ∗) does not depend on V ∗ and
{g∗s0} ∈ LRB(s0, f
∗, V ∗), as in the proof of Theorem 4. In particular, it follows that
g∗(s0) = γB(s0, f∗, V ∗) and f∗ = RA(s0, V ∗). So P0 holds.














to be compared with (3.4). Then since (f∗sk , g
∗
sk
) solves (locally) the SSE for the subgame
defined by (3.4), then g∗sk = γB(sk, f
∗, V ∗) and f∗sk ∈ RA(sk, V
∗) by construction. So
property Pk holds. By recurrence, PK holds and (f∗, g∗) is an FPE.
In contrast with Theorem 4, the existence of SSSE is not guaranteed for acyclic
games. In Section 4.3 we study a game without an SSSE. This game is not acyclic,
but it is possible to “approximate” it with an acyclic game which will have the same
qualitative properties. On the other hand, if the transitions of a game are deterministic,
in other words if the game is a multi-stage game, then it is MFS and it does have an
SSSE according to Theorem 6.
4 Numerical Examples.
In this section, we present examples illustrating different situations that can occur by
comparing the solutions returned by the different algorithms presented in Section 2.
In the example of Section 4.2, VI converges to some FPE. Also we show that the
FPE is an SSSE and the solution returned by (MP). The model involved does not satisfy
the sufficient conditions for existence and convergence identified in Sections 2.3 and 3. In
Section 4.3, we describe an example where, depending on the discount factors βA, βB:
either an SSSE exists and does not coincide with the FPE, or an SSSE does not exist, or
an FPE does not exist. Finally, in Section 4.4, we describe an example where an FPE is
shown to exist, but VI does not necessarily converge to it.
4.1 Experimental setup
The numerical experiments involving Value Iteration and Policy Iteration were performed
using Python 3.6, on a machine running under MacOS, a processor of 2,6 GHz Intel Core
i5, and memory of 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3. Operator T is implemented with Cplex 12.8.
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To solve the linear systems involved in T fg we use the Python library Numpy. In order
to solve (MP) we use the KNITRO 12.0 solver combined with AMPL.
The data of the experiments is presented tables with the convention of the following
figure. It shows the relevant parameters when the system is in state s, Player A performs




(rabA (s), rabB (s))
4.2 Example 1: FPE and SSSE coincide and VI converges
This first example shows the convergence of Value Iteration in a case where an FPE

































Table 1: Transition matrix and payoffs for each player.
This example does not satisfy any of the sufficient conditions listed in Sections 2
and 3. However, both Value Iteration and Policy Iteration converge to the FPE, and
furthermore the FPE, the SSSE and the optimal solution returned by (MP) coincide.
The application of Value Iteration, starting with the null function, results in the evolution
displayed in Figure 1. Given that Value Iteration converges, an FPE exists. The policies
and values are given in Table 2. Detailed algebraic manipulations of the value functions
given the data in this example allows us to show that the SSSE satisfies the values in
Table 2. Then, we show that this solution is a fixed point for operator T . These details
are provided in Appendix C.1.
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Figure 1: Value Iteration applied to Example 1
s1 s2
Play of A (0.3467, 0.6533) (0.6434, 0.3566)
Play of B b1 b2
vA 26.841 28.437
vB −1.807 −0.679
Table 2: Policies and values of the SSSE in Example 1
4.3 Example 2: FPE and SSSE are different
In this section we will study the stochastic game given by the data in Table 3. This
game has two states and two actions per state. Figure 2 shows a diagram of the possible

























Table 3: Transition matrix and payoffs for each player in Example 2
s2s1 (a2, b1)
6= (a2, b1)
Figure 2: Transition structure of Example 2
Whenever βB > 0, depending on the values of βA the existence and non-existence
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for both equilibrium concepts, FPE and SSSE, changes. For βA < 15 the existence of an
FPE is guaranteed, but no SSSE exist. This comes from the fact that for these values
of βA, RA(s1) = {a1} × {(f2, 1 − f2) : f2 ∈ [0, 1]} and RA(s2) = {a2} × {a2}. Clearly,
RA(s1) ∩ RA(s2) = ∅ and therefore there is no SSSE. When the game starts in the
absorbing state s1, the optimal policy for the leader is to play and announce the (static)
SSE in s1 and an arbitrary strategy in s2. When the game starts in s2, the leader has
the incentive to announce a sub-optimal strategy in s1 in order to remain in state s2 and
increase his expected reward. This could be done only for low values of βA.
In the interval βA ∈ [15 ,
1
3 ], both SSSE and FPE exists, but the strategies and values
are different. On the other hand, whenever βA > 13 , there is no FPE. This information is
summarized in Table 4. The details of this analysis are provided in Appendix C.2. We
explain in particular, in Section C.2.3.2.1, the complex dynamics of the operator when
βA >
1
3 . The dynamics of Value Iteration is numerically illustrated in Figure 3. In the
top two graphs, βA > 1/3 and the iterations for state s2 exhibit a cycle of order 3. In
the bottom two graphs, βA < 1/3 and Value Iteration converges for both states to the
FPE identified in Table 4.
SSSE FPE
βA vA(s1) vA(s2) vB(s1) vB(s2) vA(s1) vA(s2) vB(s1) vB(s2)




















1−βA 0 0 No No No No
Table 4: Existence of FPE and SSSE for different values of βA and βB > 0. Even when
both exist they may not coincide.
Policy iteration and (MP). Finally, we test the Mathematical Programming (MP)
formulation and Policy Iteration (PI) algorithm, for the different values of the parameter




2}. Table 5 summarizes the results obtained.
In this experiment whenever the SSSE exists (βA ∈ {14 ,
1
2}), (MP) computes it
correctly and Policy Iteration converges to the FPE. When no SSSE exists (βA ∈ {0, 18}),
(MP) returns a value that is influenced by the vector of weights αs. In these cases Policy
iteration converges to an FPE that is different from the solution found by (MP).
4.4 Example 3: FPE exists but VI does not converge to it
We now develop an example where an FPE does exist, but Value Iteration does not
necessarily converge to it. The data of this example is listed in Table 6.
Consider βA = βB = 12 . We claim that the pair of strategies (f
∗, g∗) and value
functions (v∗A, v∗B) in Table 7 constitute both an SSSE and an FPE. We provide in
Appendix C.3 justifications for this claim.
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2 , βB =
1
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4 , βB =
1
2
Figure 3: Value Iteration applied to Example 2: state s1 (left) and s2 (right)
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(MP) (PI)
βA αs1 = 100 αs2 = 1 αs1 = 1 αs2 = 100 αs1 = 1 αs2 = 1 s1 s2
0
vA 2 ∼ 0 −2 1 2 ∼ 0 2 0
vB ∼ 0 ∼ 0 2 2 ∼ 0 ∼ 0 0 2
f (0,1) (13 ,
2





g (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (1,0)
1
8
vA 16/7 2/7 −16/7 5/7 16/7 2/7 16/7 0
vB ∼ 0 ∼ 0 2 2 ∼ 0 ∼ 0 0 2
f (0,1) (13 ,
2





g (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (1,0)
1
4
vA 8/3 2/3 8/3 2/3 8/3 2/3 8/3 0
vB ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0 0 2










3) (0,1) (0, 1)
g (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (1,0)
1
2
vA 4 2 4 2 4 2 - -
vB ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0 - -











g (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) - -

























Table 6: Transition matrix and payoffs for each player in Example 3
s1 s2




















Table 7: Values and Policies forming an SSSE and FPE.
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When applying Value Iteration with the null function as a starting point, we get
however the evolution in Figure 4. Values obtained with Policy Iteration have a similar
behavior. Finally, (MP) returns as the optimal solution the SSSE (and FPE).






























Figure 4: Value Iteration applied to Example 3: state s1 (left) and s2 (right)
5 Application: Surveillance in a graph.
In this section we present an example of a stochastic game that models the interaction
between a security patrol and an attacker. In this game a defender has to patrol (or
“cover”) a set of locations and an attacker wants to perform an attack in one of these
locations, both maximizing their expected rewards.
The state of the game, known to both players, is defined by the locations of the
defender and attacker and whether an attack occurred or not. Given this information, the
leader decides on a patrolling strategy (a location to patrol) which is also known to the
attacker when deciding two things: where to move and if he performs an attack or not.
Once the attack is performed the game ends in one of two terminal states. This game
model situations where the defender has the information where the possible attacker it
is located, but they cannot perform any action if an attack is not performed. In real
situations, it can be the case of demonstrations or high-risk football matches.
The rewards mainly depend on the place where the attack is performed and whether
the location is being covered or not. The effectiveness of the player’s movements is
influenced by random factors: when they decide to move to some location this move may
fail due to external factors, in which case they remain in their current location.
5.1 Game description
We introduce now the elements of the model and the notation. A synthesis of this notation
is presented in Appendix A. Formally, we consider a set of locations to patrol/targets
L = {`1, `2, ..., `n}. There are some connections allowed between locations represented
by edges (denoted by E), so the board of the game is actually a graph (L, E). Player A is
the defender, Player B is the attacker. The state space is S = L × L× {0, 1} ∪ {⊥0,⊥1}.
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A typical state s = (`A, (`B, α)) ∈ S represents the defender’s location (`A ∈ L) and the
attacker’s location (`B ∈ L). The binary parameter α takes the value 1 if the attacker is
committing an attack or 0 if he is not, thereby being unnoticed in that period. There
are also two special fictitious states ⊥0, ⊥1 representing the state of the game once the
attack was performed. ⊥1 represents the case where the attack is successful and ⊥0 when
the attacker is caught. These two are absorbing states in our game.
The action space As ⊂ L for the leader represents all the possible location that he can
achieve from its current position (given by the state s). For the follower, Bs ⊂ L× {0, 1}
represents all the possible locations that the attacker can achieve in the state s with
and the decision whether to attack or stay unnoticed. We use the notation ` ∈ L to
represent the action of “move to `” and α ∈ {0, 1} to represent the action of “attacking”
or “stay unnoticed” respectively. In states s ∈ {⊥0,⊥1}, actions are irrelevant: we can
pick As = L and Bs = L × {0, 1} for such states by convention.
The probability of transitions between states is constructed using the function q`′i (`′′|`)
which denotes the probability that player i ∈ {A,B} reaches location `′′ from ` having
decided to move to `′. We assume that these probabilities are independent between
players. In particular, if there is no failure in Player i’s movements, then q`′i (`′′|`) = 1
if `′′ = `′, and 0 otherwise. The transition probabilities Qab(z|s) are then defined from
these quantities by expressions (5.1)– (5.3) as follows:
Qab(z| ⊥i) =
{










B (`′′B|`B) α ∈ {0, 1}, `′A ∈ A`A ,






B ,α)(z|`A, (`B, 1))) =

1 z =⊥0 and `A = `B
1 z =⊥1 and `A 6= `B
0 otherwise.
(5.3)
Rewards result from the interaction, or lack thereof, between the defender and the
attacker. Following the notation used in security games, we denote UuA(`) < 0 and
U cA(`) > 0 the penalty and the benefit for the defender if an attack is performed in `,
which depends only if the target is uncovered (superscript u) or covered (superscript c).
Similarly, we define UuB(`) > 0 and U cB(`) < 0 the reward (and penalty respectively) of
the attacker if the location attacked is uncovered or not. Instant rewards rA and rB are
defined as the expected values of the rewards Ri = Rabi (z|s), i ∈ {A,B}, of the dynamics
between players, which depends on the current state of the system s, the actions (a, b)
performed by the players and the future state of the system z. This technique is fairly
standard, as it is shown in [13, Ch. 2, pp.20]. The expressions for Rabi (z|s), i = A,B are
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listed in (5.4), in which s is any state and z = (`A, (`B, α)).
RabA (z|s) RabB (z|s)
UuA(`B) UuB(`B) `A 6= `B and α = 1
U cA(`B) U cB(`B) `A = `B and α = 1
PA(`A) PB(`B) α = 0
PA(⊥0) PB(⊥0) z =⊥0
PA(⊥1) PB(⊥1) z =⊥1
(5.4)
The first two lines represent the payoffs when the attack is performed, z = (`A, (`B, 1)).
In the third line, PB(`B) < 0 represents the opportunity cost and risk for the attacker
of being in location `B and not perform an attack. In the two last lines PA and PB
represents the residual value of being in an absorbing state. We assume PA(⊥0) > 0 and
PA(⊥1) < 0 and the opposite for the attacker. From the definition of RA and RB we




Qab(z|s)Rabi (z|s) i ∈ {A,B}.
The dynamics of the game is summarized as follow: First, at the start of any epoch,
the system is in a state formed by the location the both players and the behaviour of
the attacker. Then, the defender knowing the state of the game chooses a strategy f
(probably mixed) over the locations reachable from his current location. The attacker
observes the strategy and chooses where to move and whether to attack or not. We
denote this action as g. Note, that if the attacker decide to attack, the success or failure
of his strategy will be revealed in the next state. The system evolves to the following
state influenced by f , g, and Q. Both players receive their payoffs.
5.2 Computational study
Here we evaluate the solution algorithms presented in terms of solution time and quality
of the solution obtained. We begin by describing the instances of the graph surveillance
problem constructed for this computational study. We compare the solution times of
Value Iteration and Policy Iteration on every instance considered. Solving the (MP)
formulation was not a competitive solution approach for these problems. Even for
the smallest instance considered, solving the (MP) formulation using a state-of-the-art
non-linear optimization package did not return a solution after more than 5 hours of
computational time, which far exceeds the solution times observed for Value Iteration
and Policy Iteration over all instances. We therefore do not present computational results
of solving the (MP) formulation. The experimental setup used is the one described in
Section 4. To evaluate the quality of the FPE solutions obtained by these algorithms we
compare them to heuristic policies, both in the myopic and non-myopic follower case.
We generate instances of different structure and size by considering different graphs
to patrol on: paths, cycles, T-shaped graphs and complete graphs. We limit the size of
As and Bs by limiting the distance that each player can travel from one time step to the
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next. To do so, we introduce the parameter k as the maximum geodesic distance that
each player can travel through one time step.
Functions q`′A(`′′|`) are a function of the nodes that are in the shortest path between
` and `′. We denote this set of nodes as SP (`, `′) = {`, `i2 , . . . , `ik−1 , `′}. Probabilities
qA are defined as follows: if |SP (`, `′)| = 1 and SP (`, `) = {`}, then q`A(`|`) = 1, if





1− ε `′ = `′′
ε
|SP (`, `′)| − 1 `
′′ ∈ SP (`, `′)\{`′}
0 otherwise.
(5.5)
In our experiments we set the probability of failing to ε = 0.25. We assume q`′B(`′′|`) =
1`′=`′′ are deterministic: the attacker always succeeds with its intended move.
The payoff functions are defined in Table 8. The values of each parameter depend on
the degree of the node, representing the fact that nodes with greater degree are more
important in order to keep the connectivity of the graph.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
UuA(`) -10deg(`) U cA(`) 10deg(`)
UuB(`) 2deg(`) U cB(`) −2deg(`)
PA(`A) 0 PB(`B) −deg(`B)
PA(⊥0) 1 PA(⊥1) −1
PB(⊥0) −1 PB(⊥1) 1
Table 8: Payoff functions description
We test our models in instances with n ∈ {5, 10}, βB = {0, 0.9} and k ∈ {2, 3} for
each type of graph. We show how the instances increase with n and k in Table 9, which
gives the size of the state set and the average size of the sets of actions for every instance
considered. The stopping criterion is set to ε = 10−3 for both Value Iteration and Policy
Iteration.
The experimental setup is the one described in Section 4.1. Figure 5 shows the
solution times in a performance profile in logarithmic scale comparing Value Iteration
and Policy Iteration over all the instances considered. Policy iteration has faster solution
times over the instances tested. We present the solution time results separated for each
instance type in Figure 6. The results show that graph structure does not influence
significantly the solution times of Value Iteration and Policy Iteration.
We now aim to evaluate the quality of the Stackelberg equilibrium solution for
this discounted game. However, since we do not have a method to compute the SSSE
in general, we use the FPE that can be computed using Value Iteration as a proxy.
Accordingly, we compute the values of equilibrium v∗ = (v∗A, v∗B), with the respective
equilibrium policies f∗ and g∗ using the Value Iteration algorithm.
We compare the FPE solution to static policies obtained by ignoring the dynamic
nature of the game. We refer to these heuristic policies as Myopic policies. To determine
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n k type |S| |A| |B|
5
2
Cycle 52 4.8 9.7
Line 52 3.7 7.3
T 52 4.1 8.1
Complete 52 4.8 9.7
3
Cycle 52 4.8 9.7
Line 52 4.5 8.9
T 52 4.8 9.7
Complete 52 4.8 9.7
n k type |S| |A| |B|
10
2
Cycle 202 5.0 9.9
Line 202 4.4 9.9
T 202 4.6 8.7
Complete 202 9.9 9.1
3
Cycle 202 6.9 13.9
Line 202 5.8 11.5
T 202 6.3 12.7
Complete 202 9.9 19.8
Table 9: Size of the instances (number of states and average number of actions for Player























Figure 5: Solution time performance profile.
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Figure 6: Solution time performance profile for each instance type.
the Myopic policy, for each state we compute the Strong Stackelberg policies, fM , gM
of the static game, that is with βA = βB = 0. Finally, we evaluate this policy in the
dynamic setting: we obtain the value V fMgM = vM = (vMA , vMB ) as the fixed point of
operator T fMgM (see (2.6)) with real values of βA and βB.
Finally, in order to compare the policies obtained for both methods we compare the




Table 10 shows the comparison of the values for the different types of graph structures
mentioned before, and with the parameters n = 10, k = 2, βA = 0.9 and βB = 0. Recall
that in this case, Value Iteration converges to an FPE (and SSSE) because the game
is MFS. For the complete graph, the myopic strategy generates in average the same
reward as the equilibrium strategy. In the other cases, the SSSE strategy outperforms
the myopic-heuristic policy.
type v̄∗A v̄MA v̄∗B v̄MB
Cycle 9.957 8.376 1.485 2.079
Path 9.070 6.686 1.109 1.703
T 10.623 8.129 0.703 2.218
Complete 89.595 89.595 129774.653 129774.653
Table 10: Evaluation of the solution concept with βB = 0.
We repeat the same evaluation, but now with βB = 0.9. Note that in this case there
are no guarantees that Value Iteration will converge, or that the FPE policy is an SSSE.
Value Iteration found an FPE (i.e. converged) in all the instances. Table 11 shows
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the average values obtained applying the policies provided by the FPE and the myopic
heuristic.
type v̄∗A v̄MA v̄∗B v̄MB
Cycle −17.667 6.767 6.261 2.171
Path −14.102 4.938 6.617 1.506
T −12.955 6.143 6.739 2.249
Complete 89.595 89.604 129773.771 129773.762
Table 11: Evaluation of the solution concept with βB = 0.9.
Note that in relative terms, both the FPE policy and the Myopic policy return a lower
average value for Player A. This can be attributed to the follower’s change of behavior.
More significantly, the FPE solution found obtains lower values for the leader than the
Myopic strategy, significantly smaller except for the Complete graph, which is smaller
but comparable. In this case, with βB = 0.9, the game does not satisfy MFS and the
FPE solution obtained by the Value Iteration may not correspond to the SSSE, which
may lead to inefficient solutions.
6 Conclusions and Further Work
In this paper, we have demonstrated the relevance of the concept of Strong Station-
ary Stackelberg Equilibria, SSSE, and the related operator-based algorithms, for the
computation of policies in the context of two-player discounted stochastic games.
For this, we first defined a suitable operator acting on the set of value functions for
both players. We introduced the concept of Fixed-Point Equilibrium, FPE, as the fixed
points of this operator. We then investigated the relationship between SSSE and FPE. We
show that neither need to exist in general, and that when they do, they do not necessarily
coincide. We also show that the solution based on Mathematical Programming suggested
in the literature, does not necessarily compute a correct answer. We have nevertheless
identified several classes of games where SSSE and FPE do exist and do coincide. Among
these is the class of games with Myopic Follower Strategies, MFS, which include games
with myopic followers and games with leader controlled transitions.
We consider an application in a security domain, in which a moving defender protects
locations on a graph that can be attacked by a moving attacker. We give a formulation
of this problem as a Stackelberg equilibrium in a discounted stochastic game. The Value
Iteration and Policy Iterations algorithms are able to compute efficiently the FPE for
the instances considered of this security application. The instances considered were too
difficult to solve if using the Mathematical Programming formulation of the problem.
In the case of myopic follower, in which the FPE corresponds to the SSSE, we observe
that the solution obtained is efficient and outperforms heuristic policies. However, in
examples without MFS, we see that the FPE solution computed is worse than heuristic
policies.
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Future research will aim at identifying more general sufficient conditions for the two
concepts, SSSE and FPE, to coincide. The problem of finding general methodologies to
detect the existence of SSSE is still open. It is also important to determine algorithms to
find the equilibrium in games which possess SSSEs but do not satisfy the MFS condition.
Finally, It will also be interesting to determine whether the use of Value Iteration or
Policy iteration, when they do not converge, can nevertheless produce nonstationary
strategies with a good performance.
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A Notation Summary
We list in the following tables the principal notation used in the paper. Table 12 groups




S Set of states.
As, Bs Set of actions for the Leader and the Follower respectively available in state s.
rabi (s) Immediate reward for Player i when actions a and b are performed in state s.
Qab(z|s) Probability of reaching state z from state s when actions a and b are performed.
βi Discount factor for Player i.
Wi Set of feedback policies for Player i.
f, g Policies for the Leader (Player A) and the Follower (Player B) respectively.
V fgi (s)
Expected discounted sum of all rewards for Player i, when policies f and g is applied and
the starting state is s.
RB , SRB Set of optimal responses (and strong respectively) for the Follower.
γB Best response which is performed for the Follower.
RA(s) Best strategies for the Leader starting in state s.
vi Value function for Player i.
F(S) Set of value functions S → R.
T fgi One-step operator for any fixed pair of policies f and g.
T Dynamic programming operator.
γB Best response of the Follower when it does not depend on vB .
T
f
A, T One-step operator and Dynamic programming operator when T does not depend on vB .
Mi Upper bound in value functions for Player i.
Table 12: Table of general notation
Application: Surveillance in a graph
L, E Set of locations and connections between locations.
⊥0, ⊥1 Absorbing states of the game.
α Binary decision of attack or not.
Uui (`), Uci (`)
Reward or penalty for player i when an attack is performed in location ` and it is
being protected (c) or unprotected (u).




Probability for player i of reaching location `′′ from ` given that he decides to
move to `′.
n Number of locations in the graph.
k Maximum geodesic distance which the defender can move in each step time.
v∗
Average value function when a the policy obtained via Value Iteration is
performed.
vM Average value function when a myopic policy is performed.
Table 13: Table of notation for the surveillance application
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B Algorithmic Proof for the Static Case.
We provide an algorithmic proof for the existence of SSSE in Theorem 4. This proof is
also useful because it allows to compute a SSE in the static case, which is an important
step in Algorithms 1, 2 and 4.
Lemma 6. If the game G is static (i.e. has only one state), then it has a SSSE.
Proof. Proof. Since the state space has only one state, we omit the reference to states in













B f(a) ∀b′ ∈ B (B.2)∑
a∈A
f(a) = 1 (B.3)
f(a) ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A. (B.4)
Consider Algorithm 5. Each of these LPs is bounded. Therefore, they are either
unfeasible or they have a finite optimal solution. Furthermore, at least one of them
is feasible. In that case, the optimal value represents the maximum value achieved by
incentivising to the follower to play b. By picking the maximum of these values, the
optimal f of that LP with the action b is an SSE for the game.
Algorithm 5 Multiple LPs Algorithm
1: Initialize with n = 0, v0A(s) = 0 for every s ∈ S
2: for b ∈ B do
3: Solve LP(b)
4: if LP(b) is bounded then
5: Retrieve f(b) and v∗(b), respectively the leader’s optimal policy given that the
follower plays b, and its value
6: end if
7: end for
8: Set the policy g∗, in which the follower plays b∗ = argmax v∗(b)
9: return SSE (f∗(b∗), g∗) for the static game
Given that Algorithm 5 solves |B| LPs with |A| variables and |B| constraints, it finds
a SSSE in polynomial time.
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C Analysis of the examples
In this section, we provide details and justifications for the examples reported in Section 4.
In doing so, we introduce some elements useful in the analysis of the operators involved
in Value Iteration algorithms.
C.1 Analysis of Example 1
In this section, we provide details on the analysis of Example 1 introduced in Section 4.2.
We compute the Stationary Strong Stackelberg Equilibria (SSSE) and demonstrate their
existence. We compute the one-step operator and show it has also a fixed point (FPE)
which coincides with this SSSE.
C.1.1 Data
The data of this example is given in Table 14 (also Table 1). We will also specifically

































Table 14: Transition matrix and payoffs for each player in Example 1
C.1.2 Computation of the SSSE
C.1.2.1 Values of stationary strategies. Given a stationary strategy (f, g), let
us compute the value V fgi of this strategy for each player i = A,B. The notation is
fi = f(si, a1) and gi = g(si, b1). We have first, observing that transition probabilities do
not depend on the state,
Qfg =
(5
4f1g1 − f1 −
3
4g1 + 1 −
5




4f2g2 − f2 −
3
4g2 + 1 −
5







[ (29 g1 − 11) f1 − 14 g1 + 6 (−24 g1 + 10) f1 + 8 g1 − 4
(13 g2 − 3) f2 − 5 g2 + 2 (−31 g2 + 16) f2 + 20 g2 − 10
]
.
From these elements, one derives the values for Player B in each state, when she plays
the four possible strategies: with V f,xyB (s) the value at state s when x is played in state
s1 and y played in state s2:
V f,b1b1B (s1) = 10
9 f1f2 − 272 f1 − 369 f2 + 322
−9 f1 + 9 f2 + 40
V f,b1b1B (s2) = 10
9 f1f2 − 216 f1 − 429 f2 + 346
−9 f1 + 9 f2 + 40
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Figure 7: Zones Zij for the SSSE and their boundaries in Example 1
V f,b1b2B (s1) = 20
180 f1f2 − 235 f1 + 144 f2 − 55
−9 f1 − 36 f2 + 67
V f,b1b2B (s2) = 20
180 f1f2 − 207 f1 + 176 f2 − 83
−9 f1 − 36 f2 + 67
V f,b2b1B (s1) = 20
225 f1f2 − 245 f1 + 18 f2 + 26
−36 f1 − 9 f2 − 13
V f,b2b1B (s2) = 20
225 f1f2 − 225 f1 + 48 f2 − 2
−36 f1 − 9 f2 − 13
V f,b2b2B (s1) = 20
27 f1f2 + 5 f1 + 18 f2 − 20
9 f1 − 9 f2 + 10
V f,b2b2B (s2) = 20
27 f1f2 + 26 f2 − 23
9 f1 − 9 f2 + 10
.
C.1.2.2 Analysis of values. The objective is to compute, for every state, the best
strategy f ∈ WA for Player A: the set RA(s). A SSSE will exist if and only if the
intersection of these sets is nonempty.
C.1.2.2.1 Optimization for Player B. First of all, we identify the sets RB(f),
that is, the solutions to Player B’s MDP problem. This is done by calculating the
“zones” where some policy g = (bi, bj) ∈WB is optimal, formally defined as Zij = {f ∈
WA, (bi, bj) ∈ RB(f)}.







etc. and we identify four critical lines separating the four zones Zij i, j = 1, 2, as
represented in Figure 7.
C.1.2.2.2 Optimization for Player A. According to the preferences of Player
B, we have identified in the previous section a covering of WA in four sets Zij , on which
we proceed to find Player A’s maximum (this is a covering and not a partition, since the
sets Zij are not disjoint).
The plot of the functions f 7→ V f,γB(f)A (s) when f ∈ WA, are displayed in Figure 8.
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located at the point where all four zones meet. The zone that realizes the maximum
is Z21. The coordinates of this point are obtained e.g. by solving for (f1, f2) in the
equations V f,b1b1B (s1) = V
f,b1b2
B (s1) = V
f,b2b1
B (s1). The solution provides the value of f∗2
as the root of polynomial p(f2) = 3465 f32 − 22604 f22 + 26345 f2 − 8516 that belongs
to [0, 1], and f∗1 as a rational function of it. Finally, there exists a SSSE, given by the
elements in Table 2.
Figure 8: Value V f,γB(f)A (s) in Example 1, for s = s1 (left) and s = s2 (right)
C.1.3 One-step Value Iteration from the SSSE
Since there is a natural candidate for a FPE which is the SSSE computed in Table 2, we
can check whether this strategy satisfies the conditions for FPE. Replacing vB(s1) and
vB(s2) by the numerical values of Table 2, we obtain the functions (up to rounding of
floating-point values):
gB(s1, f, b1) = −14.25f + 3.13 gB(s1, f, b2) = 11.01f − 5.62
gB(s2, f, b1) = −15.25f + 9.13 gB(s2, f, b2) = 17.01f − 11.62.
Likewise for Player A, with the scrap value function vA(s1) = 26.841, vA(s2) = 28.437
(see again Table 2), the gains are given by:
gA(s1, f, b1) = 17.64f + 17.23 gA(s1, f, b2) = −9.56f + 30.15
gA(s2, f, b1) = 9.64f + 22.23 gA(s2, f, b2) = −1.56f + 26.15.
Finally, the decision problem of Player A is represented in Figure 9: for each state s, we
plot the function gA(s, f):
f 7→ gA(s, f, b1) 1{gB(s,f,b1)≥gB(s,f,b2)} + gA(s, f, b2) 1{gB(s,f,b1)<gB(s,f,b2)}.
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It is checked that the maximum is attained at the values of f that are given in Table 2.






















 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
gA(s2,f)
Figure 9: Value gA(s, f) in Example 1, for s = s1 (left) and s = s2 (right)
C.2 Analysis of Example 2
In this section, we provide details on the analysis of Example 2 introduced in Section 4.3.
We compute the Stationary Strong Stackelberg Equilibria (SSSE) and discuss their
existence. We compute the one-step operator and discuss its fixed points (FPE).
C.2.1 Data

























Table 15: Transition matrix and payoffs for each player in Example 2
Observe that state s1 is absorbing whatever the players play, and state s2 is followed
by state s1, unless players play the combination (a2, b1). This is represented in Figure 2.
Also, in state s2, Player B’s actions are indifferent to her.
C.2.2 Computation of the SSSE
C.2.2.1 Values of stationary strategies. Given a stationary strategy (f, g), let
us compute the value V fgi of this strategy for each player i =A,B. The notation is
fi = f(si, a1) and gi = g(si, b1). We have:
vA(s1) = f1g1[−1 + βAvA(s1)] + f1(1− g1)[−2 + βAvA(s1)]
+ (1− f1)g1[0 + βAvA(s1)] + (1− f1)(1− g1)[2 + βAvA(s1)]
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= 11− βA
(3f1g1 + 2− 4f1 − 2g1) (C.1)
vB(s1) = f1g1[−2 + βBvB(s1)] + f1(1− g1)[1 + βBvB(s1)]
+ (1− f1)g1[0 + βBvB(s1)] + (1− f1)(1− g1)[0 + βBvB(s1)]
= f1(1− 3g1)1− βB
. (C.2)
vA(s2) = f2g2[−1 + βAvA(s1)] + f2(1− g2)[−2 + βAvA(s1)]
+ (1− f2)g2[0 + βAvA(s2)] + (1− f2)(1− g2)[1 + βAvA(s1)]
= 11− (1− f2)g2βA
(2f2g2 − 3f2 − g2 + 1 + (1− (1− f2)g2)βAvA(s1)) (C.3)
vB(s2) = f2g2[−2 + βBvB(s1)] + f2(1− g2)[−2 + βBvB(s1)]
+ (1− f2)g2[1 + βBvB(s2)] + (1− f2)(1− g2)[1 + βBvB(s1)]
= 11− (1− f2)g2βB
(1− 3f2 + (1− (1− f2)g2)βBvB(s1)) . (C.4)
C.2.2.2 Analysis of values. The objective is to compute, for every state, the best
strategy f ∈ WA for Player A: the set RA(s). A SSSE will exist if and only if the
intersection of these sets is nonempty. We start with the absorbing state s1 and proceed
with s2.
In addition to the existing notation, introduce:
RB(s, f) = {g ∈WB | V fgB (s) ≥ V
fh




for the set of Player B’s best reactions to some fixed strategy f ∈ WA, when in state
s. The computation will have the following steps. First, we compute the sets RB(s, f),
s ∈ {s1, s2} for individual states. We deduce RB(f) by intersecting them.
Next, we look for Player A’s optimum: the maximum of V fgA (s) where g is Player
B’s (global) response to strategy f . For state s1, which is absorbing, this turns out
to be straightforward. For state s2, we focus the analysis on the sets Zij = {f ∈
WA | (bi, bj) ∈ RB(s2, f)}, that is, the subsets of WA where playing (bi, bj) is optimal
for Player B in state s2. We first identify these sets. In a second step, the maximum
of Player A’s gain is computed on each Zij . Finally, the maximum of these maxima is
identified.
Observe that the sets Zij are not disjoint in general: when they intersect, Player B is
indifferent between at least two (pure) strategies. She will then select a strategy that
maximizes Player A’s gain: the set SRB(f). However, the analysis does not need to
identify precisely this best reaction of Player B.
C.2.2.2.1 Player B’s response for state s1. We first look at the maximum
of V fgB (s1) = vB(s1) with respect to (g1, g2). Because state s1 is absorbing, the ex-
pression of vi(s1), i = A,B, depends only on f1 and g1. The set RB(f, s1) of Player
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B’s strategies maximizing vB(s1), is of the form RB(f, s1) = R1 × {b1, b2}, where
R1 = arg max{vB(s1), g ∈ {b1, b2}}.
Clearly with (C.2), Player B prefers b2 (g1 = 0) when f1 6= 0. When f1 = 0, she is
indifferent between b1 and b2. In other words: if f1 = 0, then R1 = {b1, b2}; if f1 6= 0,
then R1 = {b2}.
C.2.2.2.2 Player B’s response for state s2. We look now at the maximum of
V fgB (s2) with respect to (g1, g2), the values of (f1, f2) being fixed.



















(1− βB)(1− (1− f2)g2βB)
.
As a function of (g1, g2), vB(s2) is strictly decreasing with respect to g1, when βB 6= 0,
f1 6= 0 and 1− (1− f2)g2 6= 0. Its maximum is then attained at g1 = 0 for all values of
g2. It is independent on g1 in the other cases. We will analyze successively the cases
f1 = 0, and f1 > 0.
We first assume βB 6= 0. The case βB = 0 will be handled separately.





which is independent of g1 as determined above. Since βB > 0, as a function of g2, this
is strictly increasing if 1 − 3f2 > 0 and f2 6= 1, strictly decreasing if 1 − 3f2 < 0 and
f2 6= 1, and constant if 1− 3f2 = 0 or f2 = 1. The optimal choice of g2 is respectively
1 (B plays b1), 0 (B plays b2) and indifferent. In other words: if f2 < 1/3, the strategy
(f1, f2) belongs to Z11 ∩ Z21, if 1 > f2 > 1/3, it belongs to Z12 ∩ Z22, and if f2 = 1/3 or
f2 = 1, if belongs to Z11 ∩ Z21 ∩ Z12 ∩ Z22. Player B’s value is the same whatever she
plays in these last cases.
The case f1 > 0 and f2 > 0. When f2 > 0, 1− (1− f2)g2 6= 0. As we concluded in the
preliminaries, g1 = 0 in this case (Player B plays b2 in state s1). Points (f1, f2) with
f2 > 0 belong to either Z21 or Z22, or both. Setting g1 = 0 in (C.5), we have:
vB(s2) =
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Z11 ∩ Z12 ∩ Z21 ∩ Z22 Z11 ∩ Z12 ∩ Z21 ∩ Z22
Z21 ∩ Z22 Z21 ∩ Z22
f2 f2
f1 f1
Figure 10: Zones of WA for the response sets of Player B, RB(f, s2) (left) and RB(f)
(right); red lines are points that belong to several zones
and is either 0 if f2 = 1, or else has the sign of 1 − f1 − 3f2. In the cases f2 = 1 and
f1 = 1− 3f2, Player B is therefore indifferent and the strategy f belongs to Z21 ∩Z22. If
f1 < 1−3f2, Player B will prefer g2 = 1 (play b1): those points are in Z21. If f1 > 1−3f2,
Player B will prefer g2 = 0 (play b2): those points are in Z22. The situation is depicted
in Figure 10.
The case f1 > 0 and f2 = 0. Setting f2 = 0 in (C.5), we arrive at:
vB(s2) =







(1− g2)(3f1g1 − f1 + 1)
1− βBg2
.
It is seen that the second term in the right-hand side is always positive, and is zero when
either g2 = 1, or f1 = 1 and g1 = 0. The maximum possible for Player B’s value is
therefore vB(s2) = 1/(1− βB), and it is attained when either g2 = 1 (independently of f1
and g1: in that case, the point is in Z11∩Z21), or when f1 = 1 and g1 = 0 (independently
of g2: in that case, the point is in Z22 as well).
C.2.2.2.3 Optimization for Player A. Preliminary. The best response of
Player B is obtained as RB(s1, f) ∩ RB(s2, f) where these sets have been computed
in Section C.2.2.2.2. When f1 > 0, RB(s1, f) = {b2} × {b1, b2} so that the constraint
imposed on RB(s2, f) is that g1 = b2. When f1 = 0, no constraint is imposed. The set
RB(f) is then as depicted in Figure 10 (right). The difference with RB(f, s2) is that the
line {(f1, 0), 0 < f1 ≤ 1} does not belong to Z11.






2f2g2 − 3f2 − g2 + 1
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+ (1− (1− f2)g2)
βA
1− βA
(3f1g1 + 2− 4f1 − 2g1)
)
. (C.7)
State s1. Similarly as for Player B’s optimization, Player A’s problem does not depend
on f2 and reduces to the best choice of f1. Assume first that f1 > 0. The set SRB(f) is
not known yet, but whatever it is, Player B plays b2 (g1 = 0). Player A’s value is then
(2− 4f1)/(1− βA) which would be maximized with f1 = 0 (but the value is outside the
case studied).
If f1 = 0, Player A, has gain, from (C.1): (2− 2g1)/(1− βA). In that case also, B
will play g1 = 0.
So Player A gets to choose f1 knowing that g1 = 0 in (C.1). The optimum is reached
at f1 = 0. The best for Player A is when she plays a2 and B reacts with b2. In other




v∗B(s1) = 0. (C.8)
State s2. According to the preferences of Player B, we have identified the covering of WA
by zones Zij , i, j = 1, 2, on which we proceed to find Player A’s maximum. See again
Figure 10 for a visualization. Let mij = max{vA(s2)|(f1, f2) ∈ Zij}.








All the factors being positive, it is seen that vA(s2) ≤ 0. If f2 = 0, vA(s2) = 0 and
the maximum is realized. As soon as f2 > 0, vA(s2) < 0. In conclusion, m11 = 0, a
value realized at point (0, 0).
Zone Z12 : Z12 is the segment {(0, f2), f2 ∈ [1/3, 1]}. Player A’s value is:
vA(s2) = 1− 3f2 .
Its maximum is therefore attained at f2 = 1/3, where m12 = 0.
Zone Z21 : Z21 is the region {(f1, f2) ∈WA|0 ≤ f2 ≤ (1− f1)/3} ∪ {(f1, 1)|0 ≤ f1 ≤ 1}.







If f2 = 0, this is constant equal to 0. If f2 > 0, this is decreasing with respect to f1






1As observed in Section C.2.2.2.3, for f = (f1, 0), f1 > 0, strategy (b1, b1) belongs to RB(s2, f) but
not to RB(f).
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and its behavior as a function of f2 depends on the sign of 3βA − 1. If βA ≤ 1/3,
the maximum is at f2 = 0 with value 0. If βA > 1/3, the maximum is at f2 = 1.
We have the following table for locating the maximum m21:
case m21 location
0 ≤ βA < 1/3 0 f1 ∈ [0, 1], f2 = 0




f1 = 0, f2 = 1
Zone Z22 : Z22 is the region {(f1, f2) ∈WA|(1− f1)/3 ≤ f2 ≤ 1}. Player A’s value is:




It is therefore maximized when f2 is as small as possible, which occurs when











The location of m22 depends on the sign of 5βA − 1. Enumerating the cases, we
have the following table:
case m22 location
0 ≤ βA < 1/5
1− 3βA
1− βA
f1 = 1, f2 = 0
βA = 1/5
1




f1 = 0, f2 = 1/3
The case βB = 0. If βB = 0, Player B’s value in state s2 is 1− 3f2 and does not depend
on g1 nor on g2. In other terms, Z11 = Z12 = Z21 = Z22 = WA. Player A’s maximization
problem is not constrained, and consists in choosing all four variables f1, f2, g1, g2 in
(C.7). As in the general analysis, we have a dichotomy: either βA(1− (1− f2)g2) = 0,
either it is not 0.
In the first case, the maximization does not involve f1 or g1. Two possibilities:
• either βA = 0: Player A’s value is: vA(s2) = 2f2g2−3f2−g2 +1 which is maximized
at f2 = g2 = 0. The gain of Player A is then 1.
• or f2 = 0 and g2 = 1: in that situation, Player A’s value is always 0.
RR n° 9271
50 V. Bucarey, E. Della Vecchia, A. Jean-Marie, F. Ordóñez
In the second case, one starts with maximizing with respect to (f1, g1), which yields
f1 = g1 = 0 because it is the same as playing the static game in s1. Then the analysis
proceeds to show that f2 = g2 = 0 realizes the maximum.
The conclusion is that in all cases of βA, the optimal strategy of Player A is to play
f1 = f2 = 0 (play a2 in both states). Player B will react with g2 = 0 and g1 = 0 (unless




v∗B(s2) = 1. (C.9)
C.2.2.3 Synthesis: existence and value of SSSE Summing up the results ob-
tained in Section C.2.2.2.3 we have four cases:
0 ≤ βA < 1/5 and βB > 0: The sets RA(s) are given by the following tables:
RA(s1) s1 s2 RA(s2) s1 s2
Play of A a2 P(As2) Play of A a1 a2










The intersection RA(s1) ∩RA(s2) is empty: there exist no SSSE.
βA = 1/5 and βB > 0: The set RA(s1) is as above. The set RA(s2) is described in the
following table:
RA(s2) s1 s2
Play of A (1− 3φ, 3φ) (φ, 1− φ)





where φ ∈ [0, 1/3]. When φ = 1/3, the corresponding element of RA(s2) is equal to
an element of RA(s1). There is therefore an intersection, which is a SSSE, namely:
f1 = 0, f2 = 1/3.
βA > 1/5 and βB > 0: The set RA(s1) is still as above and the set RA(s2) is the element
described in the following table:
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RA(s2) s1 s2
Play of A a2 (1/3, 2/3)





This set is included in RA(s1). There exists then a unique SSSE equal to this
element.
βB = 0: The set RA(s1) is still as above and the set RA(s2) is the element described in
the following table:
RA(s2) s1 s2
Play of A a2 a2





This set is included in RA(s1). There exists then a unique SSSE equal to this
element.
C.2.2.4 Concluding comments on SSSE. The non-existence of SSSE for βA < 15
and βB > 0 comes from the fact that RA(s1) ∩RA(s2) = ∅ in this case. The leader plays
different strategies if she starts in state s1 than if she starts in s2. We explain briefly the
case for βA = 0.
Note that if the game starts in s1, then the optimal policy for the leader, will be the
same than in the static case, that is a game with only state s1. The set of best strategies
for the leader is to play f1 = 0 (play a2) in state s1 and any arbitrary f2 ∈ [0, 1]. The
follower reacts with b2 in state s1 and an arbitrary response in s2. In this case, the value
functions are vA(s1) = 2 and vB(s1) = 0.
If the game starts in s2, the value of Player A is, as we have already seen: vA(s2) =
2f2g2 − 3f2 − g2 + 1. It is maximized when f2 = g2 = 0, that is, when (a2, b2) is played.
If Player A performs a2, Player B is indifferent with immediate rewards (she gains 1
whatever she plays) and she has to arbitrate between staying forever in state s2, and
receive an additional βB/(1− βB) by playing b1, or jumping to state s1 and gain βBvB(s1)
by playing b2. Player A prefers this second situation because of the immediate reward,
not because of future gains. Her interest is therefore to use the tie-breaking rule of Player
B to induce her to play b2 and not b1 in state s2.
From (C.2) and (C.4), and assuming f2 = 0, Player B’s value is:
vB(s2) =
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= 11− βB
+ βB(g2 − 1)
3f1g1 − f1 + 1
(1− βB)(1− g2βB)
.
As it turns out, 3f1g1 − f1 + 1 ≥ 0 and it can be = 0 only when f1 = 1 and g1 = 0. If
Player A plays any f1 6= 0, the only way Player B can maximize her value is to play
g2 = 1 which is contrary to Player A’s preference. On the other hand, if Player A plays
f1 = 1, Player B has can choose either g1 = 0, or g2 = 1 (or both). This tie is broken
in favor of A, whose value is, when f1 = 1 and f2 = 0: vA(s2) = 1 − g2. Therefore
B picks g2 = 0 (g1 being indifferent), thereby fulfilling Player A’s objective. Playing
f1 = 1 (action a2) in state s1 is however not optimal for Player A since action a2 strictly
dominates it. This explains the lack of SSSE.
This argument does not work when βB = 0. In that case, Player B is indifferent and
spontaneously breaks the tie in favor of Player A by playing b2 in state s2,
Observe here in passing that the “myopic” case does not always bring a simplification
to the problem. Despite the fact that the myopic follower condition guarantees the
existence of FPE and SSSE, the myopic leader condition does not guarantee the existence
of SSSE.
C.2.3 The one-step Value Iteration operator
C.2.3.1 Computation of the operator. We compute here the operator T , which
maps pairs of value functions to pairs of value functions. We restrict our attention to
those pairs where the value at state s1 is the fixed-point obtained in (C.8). There are
therefore two remaining variables: vA(s2) and vB(s2). In order to clarify formulas a bit,
we use the symbols w := vA(s2) and z := vB(s2). The images (Tv)A(s2) and (Tv)B(s2)
will be denoted with w′ and z′ respectively.
By using the values in (C.8), we arrive at a single-state game parametrized by the





, −2 4βA − 21− βA
, −2




C.2.3.1.1 Operators T fgi First of all, we write down the expressions for (T
fg
i v)(s2),
i = 1, 2 for arbitrary strategies f ∈WA, g ∈WB. Those are deduced from the computa-
tion in Section C.2.2.1, by adapting the right-hand side of equations, and using values in
(C.8). Then,
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(T fgv)B(s2) = 1− 3f2 + (1− f2)g2βBz . (C.11)
C.2.3.1.2 Optimization of Player B. We now identify the reaction sets of
Player B to a given strategy of Player A, a given scrap value and state s2: the sets
RB(s2, f, vB).
From (C.11) we see that Player B’s optimal reaction to a given f2 depends on the
sign of z, unless f2 = 1 or βB = 0. We assume βB > 0 in the remainder of this section.
The case βB = 0 will be studied in Section C.2.3.3.
If f2 = 1, or f2 < 1 and z = 0, then Player B is indifferent: RB(s2, f, vB) = {b1, b2}.
If f2 < 1 and z > 0, RB(s2, f, vB) = {b1}. If f2 < 1 and z < 0, RB(s2, f, vB) = {b2}.
C.2.3.1.3 Optimization of Player A. Player A’s reward when Player B plays
b1 (g2 = 1) is:
vA(s2) = −f2 + f2
2βA
1− βA




This is the situation when z > 0. The maximum of this expression with respect to f2
depends on the location of w with respect to (3βA − 1)/βA/(1− βA). Player A’s reward
when Player B plays b2 (g2 = 0) is:




This is the situation when z < 0. The maximum of this expression with respect to f2 is
when f2 = 0. When z = 0, these two values must be compared. Which one is the largest
depends on the location of w with respect to (1 + βA)/βA/(1− βA).
After optimization with respect to f2, we have the following cases:







Case z > 0: here, Player B always plays b1.







Case w > (3βA − 1)/βA/(1− βA): A plays a2. The mapping is linear:
(w′, z′) = (βAw, 1 + βBz) =: T21(w, z) .
Case w = (3βA − 1)/βA/(1− βA): A plays anything she wants. Let φ be this
strategy, the mapping is:
(w′, z′) = (βAw, 1− 3φ+ βB(1− φ)z) =: Tφ,0(w, z) . (C.12)
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Case z = 0: Player B is indifferent with her own reward. The tie is broken in favor of
Player A.
Case w ≤ (1 + βA)/βA/(1− βA): A prefers (a2, b2). The mapping is to P22.
Case w > (1 + βA)/βA/(1− βA): A prefers (a2, b1). The mapping is T21(w, z).














if w < 3βA−1βA(1−βA) and z > 0
T21(w, z) = (βAw, 1 + βBz) if w > 3βA−1βA(1−βA) and z > 0
(βAw, 1− 3f2 + (1− f2)βBz) if w = 3βA−1βA(1−βA) and z > 0






if w ≤ 1+βAβA(1−βA) and z = 0.
(C.13)
In summary, the plane (w, z) is partitioned in three zones, as illustrated in Figure 11.
The three zones are represented: Z11 in green: points of this zone map to P11; Z22 in
blue: points of this zone map to P22; Z21 in yellow: points of this zone are mapped by






In all cases, P22 is in the zone Z21 and point P11 is in the zone Z22.
Other notable points are: Point C, the triple point and Point L = ((1 + βA)/βA/(1−
βA), 0) which delimits the two cases when z = 0: the horizontal segment (−∞, L] belongs
to zone Z22 and the segment (L,∞) belongs to zone Z21.
Point S is the candidate SSSE with coordinates (2βA/(1− βA), 0). Points C and S
are always located to the left of Point L, which means that they both belong to Z22.
The solid red line, that is, the half-line {w = (3βA − 1)/βA/(1− βA); z > 0}, is the
frontier between Z21 and Z22. It has a special status: by picking any number φ in (C.12),
an infinite number of mappings Tφ,0 can be chosen. Its image is represented as the dashed
red line.
C.2.3.2 Dynamics of the operator. Two main situations occur: either βA > 1/3,
either βA ≤ 1/3. Those are represented in Figure 11, on the left and the right, respectively.
C.2.3.2.1 Case βA > 1/3. In this situation, the fixed-point of operator T21 is
located in zone Z11. The iterations of T starting in Z22 (with z < 0 or in the segment
(−∞, L])) will be mapped first to P22, then to T21P22, then T 221P22 etc. Eventually, the
sequence T k21P22 will enter zone Z11. Then the value will be mapped to P11 and repeat the
cycle. This is in particular the case of the SSSE which belongs to Z22, see Section C.2.4.
Iterations of T starting in zone Z11 will map to P11 and continue as above.
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Figure 11: Zones of the mapping T : left, with βA > 1/3; right, with βA < 1/3
Iterations of T starting in zone Z21 will follow a sequence of points in the direction
of P21 and eventually enter Z11, then follow the cycle as above.
Depending on the choice of φ, the mapping from the frontier Z11 −Z21 may lead to
either Z11 or Z22. It then follows the patterns described.
In all cases, there is a limit cycle. The length of this cycle can range from 3 to ∞
depending on the proximity of βA to 1/3.
C.2.3.2.2 Case βA ≤ 1/3. In this situation, the fixed-point P21 of operator T21
is located in zone Z21: it is a FPE. The iterations of T starting in Z21 will converge to it.
Iterations of T starting in Z22 will be mapped first to P22, then converge to P21.
Likewise, iterations starting in Z11 will be mapped first to P11 in Z22, then converge to
P21. Iterations starting on the frontier Z11 −Z21 either converge directly, or make one
step in Z22.
C.2.3.3 The operator when βB = 0. In the special case βB = 0, the expression
for operator T fgB becomes, from e.g. (C.11):
(T fgv)B(s2) = 1− 3f2 .
Since Player B is indifferent, Player A gets to optimize her own reward, namely,
(T fgv)A(s2) = 2f2g2 − 3f2 − g2 + 1 + (1− f2)g2βAw + (1− (1− f2)g2)
2βA
1− βA
with respect to f2 and g2. This optimization concludes that f2 = 0 is always better.
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(Tv)B(s2) = 1 .
This operator is contractive and has the function in (C.9) as fixed point.
C.2.4 One-step Value Iteration from the SSSE








v∗B(s1) = v∗B(s2) = 0. (C.14)
The purpose of this is to check again that the SSSE is not an FPE, but also to open the
door to an investigation of nonstationary strategies in the context of Dynamic Stackelberg
games.
Using the operator defined in Section C.2.3.1, we find that z = 0. We must compare
w = (2βA)/(1− βA) to L = (1 + βA)/βA/(1− βA) and find that w ≤ L. Therefore the





a function we have identified as the SSSE when βB = 0, see (C.9).
Interpretation. Independently of βA, the value of both players is improved by applying
the operator once, starting from the SSSE. It means that the policy in which Player A
announces she: 1) plays once a2; 2) plays the SSSE afterwards, gives a better reward to
both players.
This nonstationary policy actually menaces to play the SSSE, since at the first step
players will play (a2, b2) and send the game to state s1. The mixed strategy (1/3, 2/3) of
the SSSE will never be played.
C.3 Analysis of Example 3
We provide here the technical justifications for the claims of Section 4.4 on Example 3.
C.3.1 Data

























Table 16: Transition matrix and payoffs for each player in Example 3
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We claim that the following pair of strategies (f∗, g∗) and value functions (v∗A, v∗B)
constitute both a SSSE and a FPE:


























In order to support this claim, we need to construct the reaction functions γB(f∗) (for
the SSSE) and γB(s, f∗, v∗) (for the FPE). As a common preliminary step, we first list
the one-step rewards corresponding to a general strategy f ∈WA and any possible action
g ∈ Bs, for all states s. The notation is f1 = f(s1, a2) and f2 = f(s2, a1).
hA(s1, f, b1, vA) = 2f1 − 1 + βA[f1vA(s1) + (1− f1)vA(s2)]
hA(s1, f, b2, vA) = f1 − 1 + βAvA(s2)
hA(s2, f, b1, vA) = −f2 + βA[f2vA(s2) + (1− f2)vA(s1)]
hA(s2, f, b2, vA) = 1− f2 + βA[f2vA(s1) + (1− f2)vA(s2)]
hB(s1, f, b1, vB) = 1− 2f1 + βB[f1vB(s1) + (1− f1)vB(s2)]
hB(s1, f, b2, vB) = −1 + 2f1 + βBvB(s2)
hB(s2, f, b1, vB) = 1− f2 + βB[f2vB(s2) + (1− f2)vB(s1)]
hB(s2, f, b2, vB) = 2f2 − 1 + βB[f2vB(s1) + (1− f2)vB(s2)].
C.3.2 Computation of the SSSE
Given a strategy f ∈WA, we know from MDP theory that the best response of Player
B is found among the four pure strategies of WB ×WB. The value of each of these
strategies for both players is obtained by solving the four equations of the list above,
where the combination of si and bj is the one sought, and where hi(s, f, b, vi) is replaced
with vi(si).
When setting βB = 1/2, the four values of V fgB (s2) turn out to be:
V f,b1b1B (s2) =
6(1− f2)(1− f1)
3− f1 − f2
V f,b1b2B (s2) =
2(4f1f2 − f1 − 5f2 + 2)
f1 − f2 − 2
V f,b2b1B (s2) =
2(1− f2)(2f1 + 1)
3− f2
V f,b2b2B (s2) =
2(2f1f2 + 3f2 − 2)
f2 + 2
.
The comparison of these four values determines four zones delimited by lines as in
Figure 12.
When evaluating Player A’s value on each of these zones, including the boundaries, it
is found that A’s optimum lies at the point specified in (C.15). This point lies at the
boundary of B’s best responses g = (b2, b1) and (b2, b2) (line L6), where f1 = 1. Player B
breaks the tie in favor of Player A by playing b2.
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Figure 12: Best response zones for Example 3
C.3.3 Verification of the FPE
When replacing vB(s1) and vB(s2) by the values in (C.16), the functions hB(s, ·) of
the variable f(s, a1) are as shown in Figure 13. The intersections occur for the values
f(s1, a1) = f∗1 := (23+
√
19)/51 and f(s2, a1) = f∗2 := f∗(s2, a1) as in (C.15). In addition,
it is checked that for these values of f(s, a1),
hA(s1, f, b1, v∗A) > h(s1, f, b2, v∗A) hA(s2, f, b1, v∗A) < h(s2, f, b2, v∗A)
so that the “strong” response of Player B is:
γB(s1, f, v) =
{
b1 if f1 ≤ f∗1
b2 if f1 > f∗1
γB(s2, f, v) =
{
b1 if f2 < f∗2
b2 if f2 ≥ f∗2 .
























Figure 13: Player B’s responses as a function of f1 = f(s, a1) in Example 3; state s1
(left) and state s2 (right)
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gA(s2,f)
Figure 14: Value of Player A as a function of f1 = f(s, a1) in Example 3; state s1 (left)
and state s2 (right)
Then, the functions gA(s, f) := hA(s, f, γ(s, f, v), v∗A) for both states s are represented
in Figure 14. It is concluded that
RA(s1, v) = {(f∗1 , 1− f∗1 ), (1, 0)} RA(s2, v) = {(f∗2 , 1− f∗2 )}.
So indeed, the policy f∗ of (C.15) is such that f∗(s) ∈ RA(s, v) for all s.
There remains to check that the values v∗A and v∗B provided are indeed the values of
the policy (f∗, g∗). Indeed:






























19− 4 + 12




















hB(s2, f, b2, v∗B) = 2(5−
√
























19 + 15[−4− 19 + 6
√





We have therefore proved that v∗ = V f∗g∗ , g∗(s) = γ(s, f∗, v∗) and f∗ ∈ RA(s, v∗) for all
s. The solution proposed in then a FPE.
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